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ABSTRACT 
THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF DIVIDEND INITIATIONS IN ASYMMETRICAL 
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS 
SEPTEMBER 1991 
DEVASHIS MITRA, B. A. (HONS), UNIVERSITY OF DELHI 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by : Professor James E. Owers 
The initiation of dividend payments has been shown (Asquith and 
Mullins [1983]) to convey significant new information regarding 
management’s expectations of future cash flows and the firm’s ability to 
support future dividend payments, and is therefore perceived to be 
relevant to firm-valuation. This study seeks to extend earlier work on 
the "information content of dividend initiations" by empirically 
examining whether dividend initiations of similar magnitude have 
differing implications for firm-valuation depending on the firm’s 
information environment. Specifically, the objective of this 
dissertation is to empirically test whether the magnitude and volatility 
of security price reaction to a dividend initiation announcement is 
associated with the firms information environment. Since, the firm’s 
information environment is not directly observable, six firm-specific 
characteristics are used as proxy measures. The six proxies are firm 
size, percentage of institutional holding in the firm’s equity, the 
number of institutions holding the firms equity, the number of analysts 
following, the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and the 
correlation between firm-earnings and macro-economy wide earnings. The 
study also attempts to statistically identify the firm-specific 
vi 
characteristic(s) which best explain(s) the magnitude of security price 
reaction at the time of dividend initiation. In general, the results 
indicate substantially higher price reaction to dividend initiation 
announcements for "low" information environment firms relative to 
"medium/high" information firms with respect to the market 
capitalization, percentage of institutional equity holding, number of 
institutions holding firm-equity, and number of analysts following 
proxies. For these proxies, the "event period" volatility of security 
returns also increases sizeably relative to the estimation period for 
"low" information environment firms. Similar increases in "event period" 
volatility are not found for the "medium/high" information environment 
firms with respect to the market capitalization, percentage of 
institutional equity holding and number of institutions holding 
firm-equity proxies. The results also indicate that firm size and the 
percentage of institutional equity holding are perhaps the most powerful 
explanatory information environment proxy variables amongst the ones 
examined in the study. 
vi i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. iv 
ABSTRACT. vi 
LIST OF TABLES. x 
Chapter 
1. INTRODUCTION. 1 
1. 1 The Dividend Puzzle: An Overview. 1 
1.2 The Study. 6 
Chapter 1 Endnotes. 10 
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE. 11 
2.1 The Dividend Policy Question. 11 
2.2 Dividend Signalling Theory. 15 
2.3 Empirical Evidence of Dividend Signalling. 22 
2.4 Differential Information. 29 
2.5 Conclusion. 34 
Chapter 2 Endnotes. 36 
3. CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES. 37 
3. 1 Informational Effects of Dividend Initiations. 37 
3.2 Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment: 
Price Eff cts. 38 
3.3 Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment: 
Volatility Effects. 44 
3.4 Conclusion. 46 
Chapter 3 Endnotes. 47 
4. SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY. 48 
4. 1 Sample Selection Criteria. 48 
4.2 The Dividend Expectation Model. 50 
4.3 Data Sources for the Information Environment 
Proxy Measures. 52 
4.4 Summary. 55 
Chapter 4 Endnotes. 58 
5. METHODOLOGY : A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS. 59 
5. 1 The Analyses of Returns. 59 
5.2 Regression Analysis. 63 
5.3 Analysis of Volatility. 65 
5.4 C nclusion. 66 
Chapter 5 Endnotes. 67 
vi i i 
6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 69 
6. 1 Analysis of Returns. 69 
6.1.1 Abnormal Returns Study for Overall Sample. 69 
6.1.2 Information Environment Proxy Data Portfolio 
Formation and Abnormal Returns. 71 
6.1.2.1 Percentage of Institutional Equity 
Holding. 72 
6. 1.2.2 Market Capitalization. 78 
6.1.2.3 The Number of Institutions Holding 
Firm Eq ity. 84 
6.1.2.4 Estimation Period Market Model R2. 92 
6. 1.2.5 The Number of Analysts Following. 98 
6.2 Analysis of Volatility.110 
6.3 Regression Analysis.115 
6.3.1 Analysis with Actual Values of Event Period SCAR....115 
6.3.2 Analysis with Absolute Values of Event Period SCAR..123 
6.3.3 Analysis with the Positive Event Period SCAR 
observations.126 
6.4 Post Dividend Initiation Dispersion of Analysts’ Earnings 
Forecasts.129 
6.5 A Comparative Evaluation of the Proxies.130 
Chapter 6 Endnotes.135 
7. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS.138 
7. 1 Summary of Findings.138 
7.2 Contribution of Study.141 
7.3 Avenues for Further Research.145 
Chapter 7 Endnotes.148 
APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND LITERATURE.149 
BIBLIOGRAPHY.161 
ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table.Page 
1. TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS 
MADE BY THE SAMPLE OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE 
PERIOD 1976-1987. 49 
2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT PROXY 
VARIABLES, NAMELY 7. OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS 
HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET 
MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST), 
IN THE CONTEXT OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS BY 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-87. 56 
3. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 80 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE PERIOD 1976-87. 70 
4. A PROFILE OF PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING IN 80 
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 
1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT. 72 
5. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO 
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS 
IN THE MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. 74 
6. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND 
MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 
10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH 0-107. INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY 
OWNERSHIP (THE LOW % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP). 76 
7. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 33 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
RANGING FROM 10.47, TO 697, (THE MEDIUM AND HIGH 7, 
INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING ROUP). 77 
8. A PROFILE OF THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION (IN DOLLAR MILLIONS) 
OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE 
PERIOD 1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND 
INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. 79 
x 
9. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO 
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
IN THE MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. 81 
10. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR*) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 39 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION RANGING FROM 
$ 9 MILLION TO $ 100 MILLION (THE LOW MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
GR U ). 83 
11. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION RANGING FROM 
$ 100 MILLION TO $ 4,000 MILLION (THE MEDIUM AND LARGE MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION GR P). 85 
12. A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY IN 80 
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 
1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT. 86 
13. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO 
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING 
THE FIRM’S EQ I Y. 88 
14. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND 
MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 
10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 35 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING 
EQUITY UPTO 10 (THE LOW NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING GROUP)... 89 
15. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING 
EQUITY RANGING FROM 11 TO 215 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING ROUP). 91 
16. A GROUPING OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS 
DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATION 
PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2. 93 
17. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO 
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON EACH FIRM'S 60 DAY ESTIMATION PERIOD 
R20F THE MARKET MO L. 94 
18. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR') 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET-MODEL R2 
LESS THAN 0. 11. 96 
19. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 40 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET-MODEL 
R2 EQUAL TO OR EXCEEDING 0.11  97 
20. A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING IN 80 
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 
1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT. 99 
21. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO 
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE 
FIRMS.101 
22. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 45 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST FOLLOWING 
NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP).... 103 
23. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 29 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING 
RANGING FROM 2 TO 16 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF ANALYSTS 
FOLLOWING RO P).104 
24. A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO 
TWO PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE 
FIRMS.106 
25. DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), 
CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) 
AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE 
TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT BY 30 
xii 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST FOLLOWING 
NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP).... 108 
26. AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), T-STATISTIC 
AND THE PERCENTAGE OF AR POSITIVE ON DAY -1 RELATIVE TO THE 
WSJI DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT DATE (DAY 0) FOR LOW 
AND MEDIUM/HIGH INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT FIRMS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS 
HOLDING EQUITY (NINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 
(R2) AND NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) PROXIES.109 
27. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD 
(T=-3,0) AVERAGE DAILY RETURN VARIANCES ACROSS INFORMATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO GROUPINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY, 
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 AND THE NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING P XIES.Ill 
28. COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD 
(T=-3,0) DAILY RETURN VARIANCES FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRM-EVENTS 
ACROSS INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO GROUPINGS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY, THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET 
MODEL R2 AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING PROXIES.113 
29. RESULTS OF FIVE SEPARATE REGRESSIONS WITH THE TWO DAY 
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS 
INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.116 
30. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY 
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD 
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.117 
31. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT 
VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING 
(LANLST) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.118 
xiii 
32. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY 
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE 
NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD 
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.120 
33. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT 
VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ 
EARNINGS FORECASTS (LDISP) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.121 
34. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY 
(T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL 
EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), 
NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (LNINST), 
ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST), THE DISPERSION OF 
ANALYSTS’EARNINGS FORECASTS (LDISP) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) 
AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.122 
35. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE 
OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER 
OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS 
INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.124 
36. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE TWO 
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS 
THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.126 
37. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE 
OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER 
OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS 
INDEPENDANT VARIABLES.127 
38. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE OF THE TWO 
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS 
THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE.128 
xiv 
39. A COMPARISON OF THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS 
IN THE MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT WITH 
THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS AFTER THE 
DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT FOR 26 FIRMS.130 
40. A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(MKT.CAP),NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), 
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 80 DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENTS.131 
41. A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(MKT. CAP),NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), 
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 63 DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENTS.132 
42. A CORRELATION MATRIX OF SIX PROXY VARIABLES, 
NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP),NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM 
EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2), 
THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) AND THE DISPERSION OF 
ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS (DISP) FOR 26 DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENTS.133 
Al. SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND POLICY THEORY.150 
A2. SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND SIGNALLING THEORIES.152 
A3. SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DIVIDEND SIGNALLING.154 
A4. THE "DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION" LITERATURE.158 
xv 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Dividend Puzzle: An Overview 
The impact of dividend policy on the value of the firm is an 
unresolved issue in the academic literature. In 1961, Miller and 
Modigliani (MM) developed a comprehensive argument showing that dividends 
are irrelevant in determining firm value. MM assert that, given the 
investment decision of the firm, its dividend policy does not affect 
1 
shareholder wealth. In short, under certain critical assumptions , MM 
argue that the value of the firm is determined solely by the expected 
cash flows provided by its investment policy. 
However, with the introduction of market imperfections, the 
payment of dividends may influence the value of the firm. First, 
consider taxation effects. Since dividend payments are not tax deductible 
to the issuing firm, market imperfections do not necessarily arise and, 
therefore, the irrelevance hypothesis remains operative. However, when 
personal taxes are considered, the payment of dividends may influence the 
value of the firm, if capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than 
2 
dividends. Farrar and Selwyn [1967] argue that, in such circumstances, 
firms should not pay dividends. Any payments to shareholders should be 
in the form of share repurchases which would be taxed at the lower 
capital gains rate. Brennan [1970] concurs with this point of view. 
However, Miller and Scholes [1978] temper the argument by showing that 
dividend income may be sheltered with interest expense resulting in the 
1 
reduction or elimination of the dividend tax disadvantage. Hence, 
according to Miller and Scholes, dividend irrelevance may hold even with 
the differential tax treatment of income from dividends and capital 
gains. Empirical evidence, however, indicates that taxes on dividends 
may not be easily avoidable. For instance, Feenberg [1981] examines tax 
documents and finds that only about 2.5% of individuals can actually make 
use of a tax-sheltering provision outlined by Miller and Scholes. 
Peterson, Peterson and Ang [1985] document that investors do pay 
substantial taxes on dividends. 
Other market imperfections are flotation and transaction costs. 
Flotation costs favor the retention of earnings in the firm, since, for 
each dollar paid out in dividend, the firm nets less than a dollar after 
flotation costs per dollar of external financing. Transaction costs 
associated with selling shares, however, tend to create a preference for 
current dividends. By nature these costs vary inversely with the size of 
the sale and can amount to a rather significant percentage for a small 
sale. Hence, stockholders with consumption desires in excess of current 
dividends will prefer to receive the incremental income from additional 
dividends rather than from capital gains. 
In general, an analysis of market imperfections does not explain 
why firms pay dividends. While, MM’s "dividend irrelevance" proposition 
appears to hold out when such imperfections are introduced in the form of 
corporate taxes, the presence of personal taxes and flotation costs 
favors earnings retention. To some extent, transaction costs associated 
with selling shares create a preference for current dividends. However, 
a strong case for paying dividends cannot be based on this factor alone. 
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In their paper on dividend irrelevance, MM recognize that stock 
prices do respond to announced changes in dividends, and often, 
dramatically so. They argue that this commonly observed strong positive 
relationship between dividend announcements and stock price movements is 
really caused by the information about future ("persistent") earnings 
that management seeks to convey to the market through changes in dividend 
policy. 
While MM introduce the possibility of an information effect, they 
do not provide a formal theory to explain the phenomenon. This is 
because the assumption of complete information in their "dividend 
irrelevance" proposition implies that the market knows the returns stream 
of the firm and values this stream to determine the value of the firm. 
The introduction of incomplete or asymmetric information suggests that 
the market actually values a perceived stream of returns. Hence, the 
initiation of a dividend payment or a change in the existing dividend 
payout by the firm may alter the market’s perception about the firm’s 
prospects, which would, in effect, alter the firm’s perceived risk class 
even though the actual risk class may remain unchanged. This proposition 
underlies the "information content of dividends" hypothesis, and marks 
the beginning of the signalling literature on the subject. 
Numerous academic studies have, since, examined the "information 
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content of dividends" hypothesis. At the theoretical level, the studies 
generally have attached specific costs (such as adverse personal taxes, 
modelled in Bhattacharya [1979] and John and Williams [1985], and 
investment opportunities foregone, represented in Miller and Rock [1985]) 
to the dividend, and examined the benefits to using dividend policy as a 
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signalling mechanism. At the empirical level, studies have attempted to 
confirm what MM hypothesized; that markets do place a value on 
announcements associated with dividend activity. "Information content", 
as generally defined in these studies, is the extent of post-announcement 
revision in market-agent beliefs concerning firm-value. Since belief 
revision is usually unobservable, the empirical tradition has been to 
infer a change in beliefs from an observed reaction in stock price. 
Much of the empirical evidence seems to indicate that the 
initiation of dividend payments or changes in the dividend payout do 
convey some unanticipated information to the market. For instance, 
studies by Asquith and Mullins [1983], Healy and Palepu [1988] and 
Venkatesh [1989] document significant stock price reactions at the time 
of dividend initiation announcements, while Richardson, Sefcik and 
Thompson [1986] find evidence of a significant increase in trading volume 
activity surrounding these events. A large number of empirical papers, 
discussed in detail in Chapter 2, have found similar evidence for regular 
dividend announcements. Two notable exceptions are the studies by Watts 
[1973] and Gonedes [1978]. Both authors document insignificant evidence 
of "information content" in dividends. However, their findings have been 
criticized on the grounds that these are based on monthly data which do 
not allow explicit identification and control of contemporaneous 
confounding events such as earnings announcements. 
Although, much of the empirical evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that dividends convey information, the effect of the firm’s 
information environment on the information content of dividend 
announcements has not been extensively examined. The firm’s information 
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environment is defined in terms of the extent of information available in 
the public domain at any given point of time. Since this is not directly 
observable, the usual practice amongst researchers has been to employ 
proxy variables. Recent studies by Mangiero [1988], Eddy and Seifert 
[1988], and Brown, Choi and Kim [1989] have examined the informational 
effects of regular dividend announcements in the context of asymmetrical 
information environments. All three studies have used market 
capitalization (or size) to proxy for the firm’s information environment. 
Further investigation into the nature and role of the firm’s information 
environment in determining the amount of information provided by dividend 
announcements may provide additional insights into the information 
signalling literature. 
Asymmetrical information may have several implications for the 
signalling impact of dividend changes. Given semi-strong market 
efficiency with costly information production and analyses, a heavily 
traded, widely monitored firm will have more information publicly 
available than a firm that is not widely followed. A dividend signal 
delivered by an obscure firm may impart more new information to the 
market than a similar signal provided by a closely monitored firm. 
Another argument in support of this premise is that the larger and more 
established a company, the greater is its access to capital markets 
resulting in higher flexibility in its ability to pay cash dividends. 
Therefore, a dividend announcement effect is more likely to exist and 
have a greater wealth impact for small or relatively obscure firms which 
are forced to be more financially conservative than large or established 
firms (Mangiero [1988]). 
5 
1.2 The Study 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to empirically examine the 
information content of dividend initiation announcements in the context 
of asymmetrical information environments. A major objective of the study 
is to search for systematic differences in the market’s response to 
announcements of similar initial dividend payments by firms operating in 
different information environments. 
The study focusses on dividend initiations rather than subsequent 
regular dividend announcements for two overall reasons. First, dividend 
initiations are, by definition, first time cash dividend payments and, 
therefore, rarely occur. Hence, any hypothesized dividend effects should 
be most visible at initiation, on the premise that these announcements 
are more likely to be unexpected than subsequent regular dividends 
(Asquith and Mullins [1983]). Second, past studies on regular dividend 
announcements have often found it difficult to adequately isolate and 
control for investor expectations. Mostly, these studies have either 
employed some dividend forecasting model to capture investors’ 
expectations (for instance Pettit [1972], Watts [1973]) or have assumed a 
naive dividend expectations model (see Aharony and Swary [1980]). We 
have attempted to mitigate this problem since the dividend initiating 
firms in our sample never paid dividends previously during their entire 
corporate histories. As observed by Asquith and Mullins [1983], for such 
firms, the dividend forecasting models employed in other studies collapse 
into the naive model. Hence, relative to subsequent regular dividend 
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changes, the naive model should reflect investors’ expectations for 
dividend initiations much better. 
Consonant with earlier studies (for instance, Atiase [1980] 
[1985], Richardson [1984], Kross and Schroeder [1988]), we define the 
firm’s information environment in terms of the extent of information 
available in the public domain at any given point of time. We employ six 
proxy variables to capture the firm’s information environment. The 
variables are market capitalization (or firm-size), percentage of 
institutional equity holding, number of institutions holding the firm’s 
equity, the correlation between the firm’s earnings and macro-economy 
wide earnings, the number of analysts following the firm, and the 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts. Our premise is that the 
first five proxy variables should reflect, in varying degrees, the amount 
of publicly available information about the firm. The sixth proxy - 
namely, the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts - should, however, 
capture qualitative differences across information environments since 
this variable connotes the existence of heterogenous beliefs amongst 
analysts. 
The first part of the study attempts to test whether the 
magnitude of security price reaction to a dividend initiation 
announcement is systematically associated with the firm’s information 
environment. This issue is addressed, however, only after we have 
ascertained the external validity of our data by examining whether the 
dividend initiation announcements in our sample are associated with 
abnormal share price movements. By examining this issue, we propose to 
provide further direct evidence of the "dividend-signalling" hypothesis 
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on the premise that the hypothesized effects (outlined in detail in 
Chapter 3) will occur only if investors impute a signalling value to the 
dividend. 
In this context, it would be pertinent to analyze the 
implications of alternate theories, particularly the tax clientele 
argument. If tax clienteles are relevant, then the initiation of 
dividend payments should induce a change in clienteles - specifically 
from high tax bracket investors to low tax bracket investors. The 
present value of any transaction costs associated with the expected 
change in clienteles as well as the present value of any tax burden 
imposed on the new clientele will appear in the market’s reaction 
(Asquith and Mullins [1983]). Clientele shifts of this nature, however, 
would not explain why the market’s reaction to dividend initiation 
announcements should systematically differ depending on the firm’s 
information environment. 
The second issue being addressed in this study is whether the 
volatility of security price reaction to a dividend initiation 
announcement is systematically associated with the firm’s information 
environment. Kalay and Lowenstein [1985] document substantial increases 
in the volatility of security returns for the days surrounding the 
dividend announcement, largely due to high levels of uncertainty during 
such periods. Moreover, Patel1 and Wolfson [1979] and Christie [1983] 
report that stock returns are more volatile around other regularly 
scheduled announcements. This increase in "event-period" returns 
volatility should also be a function of the firm’s information 
environment. Hence, the volatility increase is likely to be higher 
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around dividend announcements by "low information" firms than around such 
announcements by "high information" firms, owing to relatively higher 
levels of investor-uncertainty that may exist for "low information" 
firms. 
Finally, the study seeks to statistically identify the 
firm-specific characteristics) or proxy variable(s), amongst those 
examined, which best explain(s) the magnitude of security price reaction 
at the time of dividend initiation. This would provide a clearer 
understanding and identification of the variables which define the firm’s 
information environment more effectively, although it is recognized that 
the set of six proxy variables used in this study may not fully explain 
the firm’s information environment in its myriad, albeit, abstract 
entirety. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
provides a detailed review of the literature. Chapter 3 conceptualizes 
the research questions of the study and defines the hypotheses. Chapter 
4 provides details regarding the data and the information environment 
proxy variables. The methodology for the statistical tests is discussed 
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 discusses the results of testing the hypotheses. 
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the findings, reviews the 
contributions of the study and suggests directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1 Endnotes 
1. The assumptions in MM’s [1961] "dividend irrelevance" model are: 
i) Perfect Capital Markets: This implies that 
a) Transactions of individual buyers and sellers of securities do not. 
have an appreciable impact on their ruling price. 
b) All traders have equal and costless access to information. 
c) There are no tax differentials either between distributed and 
undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains. 
d) There are no transactions costs. 
ii) Rational Behavior: Investors always prefer more to less. 
iii) Perfect Certainty: Investors have full knowledge regarding the 
future investments and profits of all firms. 
2. Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, capital gains are taxed at the same 
rates as ordinary income. However, this does not completely eliminate 
the tax disadvantage of dividends since capital gains are still not 
taxed until realized. 
3. A review of relevant theoretical and empirical work is provided in 
Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
2.1 The Dividend Policy Question 
The foundation for a modern theory of dividend policy was 
provided by the dividend irrelevance proposition of MM [1961]. The MM 
model is a logical starting point not only for its historical 
significance, but also for the pure and frictionless dividend market it 
depicts. It serves as a convenient standard of comparison for later 
models. 
According to the MM argument, given the stringent set of 
assumptions discussed in Chapter 1 (Endnote 1), the firm may utilize net 
cash flows in either of two ways: 
i) by investing in new projects to generate additional future cash flows, 
or 
ii) by paying dividends to shareholders. 
Assuming homogenous beliefs and frictionless markets, they argue 
that the first form of utilization (new investment) need not be 
curtailed as a result of the second (payment of dividends to 
shareholders), if the firm can costlessly issue new equity for each 
dollar paid in dividends. As a result, the dollar amount and timing of 
future cash flows remains unaltered despite the payment of dividends, and 
hence the value of the firm remains unchanged This assertion is shown to 
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hold on a per share basis as well where the ex-dividend price of each 
share plus the amount of its dividend must equal the pre-dividend price. 
The MM hypothesis of dividend irrelevance has not gone 
unchallenged, particularly when their strict assumptions are relaxed. 
Farrar and Selwyn [1967] and Brennan [1970] examine investor choice, 
given the differential personal tax rates between dividends and capital 
gains. Farrar and Selwyn [1967] use partial equilibrium analysis and 
assume that individuals seek to maximize their after-tax income. The 
major implication of the model is that rational investors would prefer to 
receive income from capital gains rather than from dividends as long as 
the tax rate on capital gains is less than the personal tax rate. Hence, 
firms should not pay dividends. Any payment to shareholders should be in 
the form of share repurchase which will be treated as capital gains and 
subjected to lower personal taxation. 
Brennan [1970] extends the work of Farrar and Selwyn into a 
general equilibrium framework, where investors maximize the expected 
utility of wealth by minimizing the tax burden. In his model, 
shareholders in lower marginal tax brackets will seek higher dividend 
payouts from firms that are more highly leveraged, while investors in 
higher tax brackets will attempt to acquire wealth through capital gains 
and simultaneously accumulate personal leverage. The author concludes 
that, with risk held constant, the market will demand a higher total 
return on shares with higher dividend yields, due to the higher tax rate 
on dividend income. Hence, although Brennan’s model is more robust than 
the Farrar and Selwyn model, his overall conclusions are quite similar to 
theirs. 
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Miller and Scholes [1978], however, show that dividend 
irrelevance holds even in a world with personal tax rates. They argue 
that the high-income investor can borrow to acquire high-dividend shares 
and offset the tax differential by deducting the interest paid on the 
loan. Hence many shareholders need not pay more than the capital gains 
rate on dividend income. 
Several studies, however, provide empirical evidence indicating 
that taxes on dividends may not be easily avoidable. For instance, 
Feenberg [1981] examines tax documents and finds that only about 2.5% of 
individuals can actually utilize the tax-sheltering provisions outlined 
by Miller and Scholes. Peterson, Peterson and Ang [1985] have documented 
that investors pay substantial amounts in taxes on dividends. For 
example, in 1979 over $10 billion was paid in taxes on dividends 
totalling $34 billion. 
Implicit in MM’s assumption of full information is that there are 
no agency costs since actions of agents such as managers are fully 
observable. The introduction of asymmetric information may generate 
incentives for wealth redistributing agency behavior among different 
claimants of the firm. There are at least two principal-agent 
relationships in which dividend policy plays a role. The first is the 
potential bondholder (principal) versus the shareholder (as agent of the 
bondholders’ funds) conflict, which arises due to the limited liability 
feature of corporations. Limited liability allows shareholders 
potentially very large gains but limited losses. This encourages them to 
take more risk at the expense of bondholders. Moreover, payment of 
dividends to shareholders bypasses the priority structure of claims, as 
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shareholders are able to receive the firm’s cash flows before the 
bondholders’ claims are satisfied. In the extreme, liquidation of the 
firm to pay shareholders dividends will leave bondholders holding the 
empty corporate shell. Therefore, from the bondholders’ viewpoint, a 
smaller dividend payout is better, and the need to constrain dividend 
payment as part of bond covenants is recognized (John and Kalay [1982]). 
The second agency problem is between outside shareholders versus 
the management (the agent). Dividend payments have actually been 
proposed as partial solutions to agency problems of this nature, on the 
premise that firms which pay dividends may be forced to obtain funds in 
the primary market more frequently, and will, therefore be more closely 
monitored by intermediaries such as investment bankers (see Rozeff 
[1982], Easterbrook [1984]). Rozeff suggests that there could be a 
trade-off between the flotation costs of raising external capital and the 
benefits of such reduced agency costs when the firm increases its 
dividend payout. Two considerations limit the usefulness of this 
argument. Firstly, firms could in fact pay more dividends and 
underinvest, thereby avoiding the extra scrutiny. Secondly, outsiders do 
not necessarily monitor corporate management’s performance between 
periods of external financing any better than analysts who continually 
monitor the firm (Miller and Rock [1985]). 
While various theories have been offered to explain the observed 
dividend-paying behavior of firms, the purpose of this study is to 
examine "dividend-signalling theory", which also stems from the work of 
i 
MM [1961]. The following sub-section conducts a review of the 
theoretical work in this area. 
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2.2 Dividend-Signalling Theory 
The MM model of dividend irrelevance assumed "full information", 
and hence could not explain how dividends might possess new information. 
2 
Several papers have, since, sought to relax this assumption and examine 
the role of dividends as signalling mechanisms. A common underlying 
premise in these studies is that for dividends to have "informational 
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content", the following conditions should hold : 
(i) Managers possess more information about the firm’s future prospects 
than outside investors. 
(ii) Managers have incentives to make this information known. However, 
since much of it may be confidential in nature, a direct release of 
such information may jeopardize future prospects or give 
competitors an advantage. Therefore, the information must be 
conveyed indirectly through signals. 
(iii) The dividend change, as a signal of new information, has to be 
credible. In order to penalize false signallers, the false 
dividend signal should entail a cost. 
(iv) Since a number of financial decisions can be interpreted as 
signals, the dividend should be amongst the least costly signals. 
Otherwise, based on marginal analysis, managers would prefer to use 
a lower-cost signal. 
Ross [1977] postulates a "one-period" model wherein managers seek 
to resolve existing information asymmetries between themselves and the 
shareholders by signalling the firm’s ability to support risky debt in 
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its capital structure. In the model, managerial compensation is 
positively linked to firm-value - this feature is the cost of "false 
signalling". While Ross’s argument pertains to capital structure, he 
states that his hypothesis applies to dividend policy as well (1977, 
p.39). Moreover, Kalay [1980] has shown that the Ross model holds for 
dividend policy, and need not be confined to arguments regarding capital 
structure. 
In his "one-period" model, Ross distinguishes between two "types" 
of firms which begin with equal market values at time = 0. After one 
period. Type "A" firms will have a total return (hence ending value) 
equal to "a", and Type "B" firms will accrue value equal to "b", where 
the quantity "a" is greater than "b". The initial equality in the market 
values of the firms arises because at the beginning of the period 
investors are still unaware of management’s expectations regarding future 
returns for the two otherwise identical firms. 
This asymmetry of information is resolved when managers signal 
their expectations regarding future cash flows through dividend payments. 
The cash flows generated from returns "a" are sufficient to support 
dividend payments, and still allow the firm to finance its debt service 
and all other financial obligations. Returns "b", however, are not 
sufficient to allow the payment of dividends without increasing the 
probability of bankruptcy. 
In Ross’s one-period "incentive signalling" model, management 
compensation is positively linked to the value of the firm, with managers 
incurring the maximum penalty if the firm enters bankruptcy. This 
feature is the "signalling" cost. Therefore, there is a wealth incentive 
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for managers to issue the correct signal regarding firm type when 
establishing the firm’s dividend policy. Managers of "A" firms will 
increase their personal compensation by issuing the proper positive 
dividend signal, while managers of "B" firms will maximize their personal 
wealth by not mimicking their "A" counterparts and sending false signals. 
Kalay [1980], adapts the Ross argument to dividend payments. He 
argues that investors will view any increase in dividend payments as a 
"correct" signal and attribute a higher value to it, given their 
knowledge of the management compensation scheme. Similarly, any future 
reduction in dividend payments will cause a decline in the value of 
shares, thus adding to the incentive for managers to signal correctly. 
A major implication of the Ross model is that once dividends are 
initiated, shareholders anticipate a periodic signal by management who 
are, therefore, in effect forced to submit to a periodic review. In 
other words, management is thought to increase the dividend only when it 
is confident that the new dividend can be maintained over time. A number 
of empirical papers have substantiated this conclusion. Lintner [1956], 
Fama and Babiak [1968] and Aharony and Swary [1980] have provided 
evidence to show that firms change regular dividends relatively 
infrequently - in only 23% to 25% of the sampled quarters. 
Bhattacharya [1979] develops a model closely related to that of 
Ross. His objective is to explain why firms pay dividends despite the 
personal tax disadvantage. In his model dividends convey information 
about the value of the firm which cannot be fully communicated by other 
means such as annual reports or earnings forecasts. Hence, an unexpected 
dividend increase will be taken as a favourable signal. It is expensive 
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for less successful firms to mimic the signal because they must incur 
extra costs associated with raising external funds in order to pay the 
cash dividend. Hence, the signalling value of dividends is positive and 
can be traded off against the tax disadvantage associated with the 
dividend income to achieve an optimal payout. This suggests the 
possibility of an optimal dividend policy. 
Hakansson [1982] recasts the dividend irrelevance propositions in 
the taxless case (MM [1961]) and the tax-neutrality case (Miller and 
Scholes [1978]) into a general equilibrium framework, wherein the 
potential of dividends to provide information is explicitly recognized. 
He demonstrates that dividends serve no useful role when investors have 
homogenous beliefs regarding the dividend payout, and financial markets 
are fully efficient. In fact, with positive costs, dividends reduce 
overall welfare (efficiency). On the other hand, dividends can improve 
welfare when they are informative, provided investors have heterogenous 
beliefs, financial markets are incomplete, and investors have differing 
attitudes about how they wish to allocate consumption expenditures over 
time. Hence, according to the Hakansson model, for dividends to play a 
useful "signalling" role, they should not only be informative, but the 
above three conditions should also be satisfied. 
The Miller and Rock [1985] model assumes asymmetric information 
between managers and outside investors about the state of the firm’s 
current earnings. This assumption is shown to negate the Fisherian 
criterion for optimal investment by the firm -i.e. invest in real assets 
until the marginal internal rate of return equals the risk-adjusted rate 
of return on securities. Within this asymmetric information framework, 
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knowing that the market takes announced dividends as a clue to unobserved 
earnings, managers are tempted to increase "unexpected" dividends in 
order to run up stock prices, at the expense of cutting back on 
investment. The presumption is that, although the market will eventually 
learn the truth, the immediate short run benefits to seller-shareholders 
and managers (whose compensations are tied to the firm’s short-run price 
performance) will exceed the loss to shareholders who do not sell. Using 
a rational expectations framework, the model derives a signalling 
equilibrium in which the optimum investment level is shown to be below 
the first-best optimum investment of the MM [1961] full-information 
model. Hence, while the benefit from signalling positively through 
dividends is the resultant increase in firm value, the cost in this model 
is underinvestment and not (as in the Bhattacharya model) increased taxes 
to shareholders. 
John and Williams [1985], like Bhattacharya, impute adverse 
personal tax costs to dividends. In their signalling equilibrium model, 
insiders in firms with valuable future cash inflows distribute dividends 
and receive enhanced prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash 
by both their firm and its current stockholders exceeds its internal 
supply of cash. Among all firms which signal, those with more favourable 
inside information optimally pay larger dividends and realize higher 
prices for their stock. 
In Ambarish, John and Williams [1987] an efficient signalling 
equilibrium with dividends and net new issues of stock is constructed. 
Because corporate insiders have the choice to exploit multiple signals, 
the efficient mix must minimize their costs. The authors distinguish 
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between two categories of firms - those with valuable assets in place but 
limited investment opportunities (usually, large mature firms) and those 
with few assets in place but valuable opportunities to invest (the small, 
rapidly growing firms). For the former firms, inside information should 
emanate mainly from existing assets while for the latter private 
information should arise primarily from current opportunities. Like 
Miller and Rock, the authors show that in equilibrium, firms may both 
distribute dividends and also deviate from first-best investment 
situations. Moreover, while the impact of dividends on stock prices is 
shown to be positive, the announcement effect of new stock is negative 
for firms with private information primarily about assets in place and 
positive for firms with inside information mainly about opportunities to 
invest. A major implication of this paper is that since the tax on 
dividends is not insignificant, the dividend in itself may not be an 
economical signal. By combining the dividend signal with other signals 
such as debt or investment changes, the firm may be able to obtain a 
less-costly signalling-mix. 
The immediate theoretical inference that emerges from the 
"dividend signalling" models, therefore, is that the announcement of a 
dividend (or a change in dividend) conveys information about management’s 
assessment of firm-specific prospects, that this information is 
different from other information provided by management, and, hence, may 
cause an immediate investor reaction. For dividend announcements to be 
convincing, unambiguous signals, they must be costly at the margin. All 
the models discussed above have attached specific costs (either adverse 
personal taxes or investment opportunities foregone) to the dividend. 
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Moreover, these models have shown that because of such costs, the 
announcement effects of dividends must be positive. 
The dividend signalling models have been criticized on at least 
4 
two counts. Firstly, dividend signalling with personal tax as a 
"signalling cost" (as in Bhattacharya [1979] and John and Williams 
[1985]) suffers from an assignment problem. For, whereas the cost of 
false signalling should justly be borne by the insiders (managers), 
signalling cost in the form of adverse taxes falls mostly on the outside 
shareholders. According to Ang [1987] this difficulty may be alleviated 
by extending the dividend signalling argument to a multiperiod framework 
where longer term variables such as the future compensation of managers, 
the value of their reputation, and the increased cost of future 
financing, may serve as alternate means to bond the manager, giving the 
signals more credibility. A possible second criticism of dividend¬ 
signalling equilibrium models is that they have a "self-fulfilling" 
quality. In a world of rational expectations, managers and outside 
investors display predictable game-like behavior. For instance, managers 
do not reduce dividends because they feel that investors would react 
unfavourably, while investors react negatively to a dividend cut because 
they believe that managers would be reluctant to cut dividends. However, 
some evidence of this "self-fulfilling" behavior has been provided by 
Kalay and Lowenstein [1986] who have documented that whenever management 
faces an unfavourable prospect, they tend to delay the dividend 
announcement; investors, aware of such management behavior, react 
negatively to the delay. 
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A plethora of empirical papers have sought to empirically examine 
"dividend signalling" theory. A review of this empirical literature on 
the "information content of dividends" follows in the next sub-section. 
2.3 Empirical Evidence of Dividend Signalling 
The first major empirical study on the "information content of 
dividends" hypothesis is the paper by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(FFJR) [1969] which actually pertains to stock splits. The authors find 
that all stock split announcements are subject to substantial abnormal 
returns. However, further analysis reveals that for firms which increase 
dividends subsequent to the split, cumulative abnormal residuals (CAR) 
remain positive, whereas for firms which subsequently decrease the 
dividend or maintain it at the same level the CAR’s decline rapidly and 
perform poorly thereafter. The authors conclude that the stock split 
announcement, in its role as a precursor of future cash dividend 
increases, conveys useful information to the market. However, the 
information relates to an anticipation of future cash dividend increases 
which are assumed to convey important information to the market. 
In separate tests of market efficiency, Pettit [1972] and 
Charest [1978] use announced changes in dividend policy to measure how 
quickly the market adjusts to new information. Both find that the market 
tends to adjust immediately to dividend increase announcements. However, 
in Charest’s study, the adjustment process is slow for dividend decreases 
as the negative return effects continue beyond the quarter in which the 
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dividend decrease is announced. Hence, while both studies find evidence 
of "information content" in dividend announcements, Charest’s results 
are not very robust with regard to market efficiency. 
Two early papers which do not find significant evidence of 
"information content" in dividends are by Watts [1973] and Gonedes 
[1978]. Using a model which regresses dividend payments on one-year 
lagged earnings, Watts offers two possible explanations for his 
contradictory results. First, he raises the possibility that the true 
expectation of future earnings may have been obscured by the lagged 
earnings variable in his model. Alternatively, he suggests that 
management may not be imparting any proprietory information through 
dividend policy. In a similar vein, Gonedes [1978] finds that current 
and past dividends do not improve the accuracy of forecasts of future 
earnings relative to forecasts based on only current and past earnings. 
Hence, the theoretical prediction that the information contained in 
dividend announcements relates to future cash flows or earnings is not 
supported by his study. 
A major shortcoming in both the Watts [1973] and Gonedes [1978] 
studies is that they employed monthly data. This did not allow them to 
explicitly identify and control for contemporaneous information such as 
earnings announcements. To avoid this problem, a study by Aharony and 
Swary [1980] uses daily data and controls for possible earnings 
announcement effects by examining dividend announcements which were made 
at different dates than earnings announcements. The study concludes from 
its findings that announcements of "changes in quarterly dividends 
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provide useful information beyond that provided by corresponding 
quarterly earnings numbers" (1980, p.11). 
In contrast to the previous studies, Asquith and Mullins [1983] 
test for the "information content of dividends" by examining cash 
dividend initiations. They assume that these events are more likely to 
be unexpected than subsequent regular dividend announcements for which 
the market would already have discounted an expectation of future cash 
flows based on the firm’s past dividend history. On the other hand, if 
investors possess little past information upon which to value the shares, 
then the initiation of dividend payments should convey significant new 
information regarding management’s expectations of future cash flows and 
the firm’s ability to support future payments. Consistent with their 
hypothesis, Asquith and Mullins find the average two-day excess return on 
firms initiating cash dividends to be much higher than for the largest 
absolute subsequent increase in dividends. They conclude that dividend 
initiations "convey unique, valuable information to investors" (1983, 
p.94). 
Several studies on dividends have, since, examined dividend 
initiation data. Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson [1986] use the dual 
event periods of 1) the dividend initiation announcement and 2) the 
interval from announcement to ex-dividend date in order to investigate 
the implications of clientele theories that changes in dividend policy 
should result in a marked increase in trading volume as shareholder 
clienteles change. They conclude that volume increases primarily in 
response to the signal about future earnings contained in the dividend. 
Clientele adjustments are found to be small. 
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Following Lintner [1956], several studies have observed that 
managers are reluctant to reduce or omit dividend payments (eg; FFJR 
[1969], Pettit [1972]). This point is further addressed by Kalay [1980]. 
Using Ross’s [1977] model, Kalay hypothesizes that dividend reductions 
which are forced on firms with restrictive debt covenants, cannot convey 
new information concerning the expectation of future cash flows. From a 
sample of 197 dividend reductions, he identifies only 10 as resulting 
from debt contract constraints and, therefore, concludes that most 
dividend cuts are not forced through contractual arrangements. Hence, he 
is unable to reject the hypothesis that dividend reductions signal 
management’s need or intention to conserve liquid funds in the firm. 
This issue of whether dividend reductions are often necessitated 
by the firm’s need to conserve cash for future investment in the face of 
projected cash shortages is examined by Woolridge and Ghosh [1987]. They 
argue that if a firm has plenty of profitable investment opportunities 
available, but little available cash, and if its cost of external 
financing is substantial, then the value of its shares may be increased 
by reducing current dividends and increasing investments. In their test 
of this hypothesis, they find that while the market perceives all 
dividend cuts as negative signals, the stocks of firms which reduce 
dividend payments for the purpose of increasing investment generally 
recover all lost returns in the ensuing two years. The authors contend 
that the initial negative market reaction for firms with stated growth 
prospects occurs because of the moral hazards confronting managers. In 
other words, shareholders may not believe the explanations management 
offers to justify the reduced dividend payout. 
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A similar issue has been addressed by Divecha and Morse [1983]. 
Their study groups firms increasing their dividends into two samples - 
one comprising of firms that also increased their payout ratios and the 
other of firms that decreased their payout ratios. Their results show 
that the group of firms decreasing their payout ratios at the time 
dividends were increased recorded higher abnormal returns than the firms 
increasing their payout ratios. The authors attribute the market’s 
interpretation of the reduced payout ratio as a sign of access to 
profitable growth opportunities. A potential problem with their 
conclusion is that the dividend payout ratio falls as earnings increase; 
and the superior market performance of lower payout firms could be 
attributed to the higher earnings which caused the payout ratio to fall. 
This finding of Divecha and Morse [1983] is partially substantiated by 
Kane, Lee and Marcus [1984] who show that investors give more credence to 
unanticipated dividend increases or decreases when earnings are also 
above or below expectations. 
An alternative explanation for stock price behaviour around 
dividend announcements is the "wealth redistribution hypothesis" 
5 
motivated by agency theory. As noted by several researchers , unexpected 
dividend increases would redistribute wealth from the bondholders to the 
stockholders if such increases are financed by issuing new debt (of equal 
or higher seniority than the existing debt) or by reducing investment 
outlays. Thus, the positive (negative) impact of dividend increases 
(reductions) on stockholders’ wealth can be atleast partly explained by 
bondholders’ losses (gains). However, the findings of Woolridge [1983] 
and Handjinicolaou and Kalay [1984] indicates that the signalling effect 
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appears to dominate since there is no clear evidence that dividend 
increases may be used as a method to expropriate wealth from bondholders. 
In spite of the empirical evidence, none of the papers cited 
above fully substantiated a major premise of the "information content of 
dividends hypothesis"; viz, share prices respond to dividend changes 
because dividend changes are forecasts of future earnings. The results 
of several later papers (namely, Ofer and Siegel [1987], Healy and Pelepu 
[1988], Venkatesh [1989], and Brown, Choi and Kim [1989]), have 
substantiated this premise. 
Ofer and Siegel [1987] present evidence that security analysts 
revise their earnings forecasts following unexpected dividend changes and 
that the magnitude of the revision is related to the dividend change. 
Two recent papers (Healy and Palepu [1988] and Venkatesh [1989]) 
examine the relationship between dividend initiations and future 
earnings. Healy and Palepu [1988] document that dividend-initiating 
firms experience earnings growth in the year of the dividend announcement 
and for two subsequent years, but not thereafter. While Healy and Palepu 
[1988] primarily focus on the initial dividend announcement, Venkatesh 
[1989] hypothesizes that investors learn from the initial dividend as 
well as from subsequent dividends. He finds that the information content 
of earnings announcements is substantially lower after the introduction 
of quarterly cash dividends, regardless of whether the earnings 
announcements precede or follow the associated dividend announcements. 
Venkatesh also finds that the the volatility of daily returns is 
lower in the post dividend period, primarily due to a decrease in the 
"firm-specific" (non market) component of volatility. He explains this 
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phenomenon by suggesting that, in the post dividend period, investors 
accord less importance to pieces of "information" (announcements, rumors) 
that could have induced larger price reactions in the pre dividend 
period. This evidence reinforces the notion that investors view 
dividends as an information transmission mechanism. 
Recently, McCann [1987] has suggested that the firm’s dividend 
decision is essentially an investment decision. He argues that the 
initiation of dividend allows the firm a broader access to capital 
markets and lowers the cost of capital. This increases the firm’s level 
of investment as more projects now have a positive net present value. 
Consistent with these observations, McCann finds that, following the 
initiation of dividend, the systematic and unsystematic risk of common 
stock returns declines whereas the firm’s investment activity increases. 
However, McCann also finds evidence of a significant decrease in the 
growth in the cash flow per share. Overall, McCann’s findings suggest 
that the dividend initiation is signalling not higher earnings but less 
risk. 
Several recent studies have focussed on the informational effects 
of regular dividend announcements in the context of the firm’s 
informational environment. Mangiero [1988], Eddy and Seifert [1988], and 
Brown, Choi and Kim [1989] have shown that the information content of 
regular dividend announcements is negatively related to firm size. 
Brown, Choi and Kim [1989] examine the extent to which firm size, and 
signal preemption influence the information content of dividends and 
earnings. They show that (i) the information content of dividends and 
earnings is negatively related to firm size (ii) dividends are more 
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preemptive of earnings than vice versa, suggesting that dividends are the 
more informative signal regarding firms’ future cash flows. 
The findings of Bajaj and Vijh [1990], however, are somewhat 
anomalous. The authors examine the market’s response to all dividend 
announcements, without any ex-post selection criterion, and document 
statistically significant positive excess returns around the dividend 
g 
announcement dates. However, the positive excess returns are higher for 
small-firm, low-priced and high-yield stocks. The authors conclude that 
"these effects cannot be interpreted as pricing for missing factors from 
am particular formulation of the CAPM" [1990, p.22]. 
2.4 Differential Information 
The firm’s information environment has been the subject of 
extensive theoretical and empirical investigation. A number of 
researchers, including Verrechia [1979] and Atiase [1980], have analyzed 
various firm-specific factors which provide incentives for private 
information acquisition. The major conclusions that have emerged from 
such studies are that 
a) the scale of operation (i.e the amount of potential information in a 
particular firm) must be sufficiently large to justify the cost of 
information acquisition 
and 
b) there must be sufficient demand and supply for a stock such that its 
price is not easily affected by an individual trader’s activities, 
thereby revealing his private information at the time of trade. 
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Verrechia [1979] has shown that the amount of privately acquired 
information impounded in the stock price through trading increases with 
increased market participation. Observing that market participation 
increases with firm size, Atiase [1980] hypothesizes that the amount of 
predisclosure (i.e. non-accounting) information production and 
dissemination is an increasing function of the capitalized value of the 
firm. This hypothesis is further strengthened by Richardson [1984] who 
suggests that because institutions do not have holdings in low market 
capitalization firms due to liquidity problems, analysts in turn have 
less incentive to follow smaller firms due to lower expected commission 
revenues from institutional transactions. 
Damodaran [1985], suggests that the return generating process of 
information deficient firms may more closely resemble a mixed 
jump-diffusion process rather than the typical continuous distribution 
assumed by the use of standard event study procedures, since the nature 
of information arrival for such firms is discrete. However, for firms 
with numerous information sources, information arrival is likely to 
consist of the frequent arrival of smaller amounts of new information on 
average. Hence, the stock prices of information deficient firms will be 
adjusted less frequently relative to the stock prices of closely followed 
firms, to reflect the new information. Damodaran’s [1985] paper may be 
interpreted to suggest that the marginal information contained in any 
firm-specific announcement will decline as the firm’s prior information 
sources increase. 
From a different standpoint, Barry and Brown [1985] formulate a 
model of equilibrium asset pricing under differential information, 
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wherein the securities of firms with less information availability are 
shown to have greater perceived risk. Investors demand higher returns 
from such low information securities due to greater uncertainty. Hence, 
although these securities may appear to earn positive abnormal returns, 
in fact, the "excess" returns would only be commensurate with higher 
risk. 
A number of empirical studies have reported results consistent 
with the above predictions. Atiase [1985] finds a much greater price 
adjustment to the quarterly earnings announcements of small firms than 
that of large firms. Freeman [1987] reports similar findings, although 
he observes that the security prices of large firms anticipate accounting 
earnings earlier than the security prices of small firms. 
Studies by Grant [1980] and Kross and Schroeder [1988] attempt to 
corroborate these findings for annual earnings announcements. Grant 
[1980] suggests that there is a greater flow of prior non-accounting 
information for large firms versus small firms between releases of 
accounting reports. Using exchange-listing status and number of prior 
news articles as surrogates for prior information availability, he finds 
a significantly greater number of interim news items appearing in the 
Wall Street Journal for NYSE firms relative to OTC firms. Kross and 
Schroeder [1988] hypothesize that earnings announcements convey more 
information on obscure firms than on prominant firms. They define 
"prominance" as the amount of coverage in the Wall Street Journal for a 
specific firm. Their findings "lend strong support to the proposition 
that earnings announcements convey more information on obscure firms than 
on prominant firms" (1988,p.72). 
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As discussed in Section 2.3, recently, Mangiero [1988], Eddy and 
Seifert [1988]. and Brown, Choi and Kim [1989] have shown that the 
information content of regular dividend announcements is negatively 
7 
related to firm size. 
Richardson [1984] selects multiple measures of market 
participation and shows that smaller firms, on average, have 
characteristics that are suggestive of lower market participation; 
namely, fewer shareholders, less dispersion in ownership, less press 
coverage, less following by analysts, less shares held by institutions, 
and less share turnover. Richardson’s study suggests that different 
measures of the firm’s information environment are likely to be highly 
correlated with firm-size. 
McNichols and Manegold [1983] use the presence or absence of 
quarterly accounting reports as a surrogate for the extent of prior 
information availability. They show that the report-week price reaction 
is, on average, greater for firms with no quarterly reports than for 
firms with quarterly reports. This conclusion is consistent with 
Ohlson’s [1979] theoretical result which demonstrates that the price 
reaction to earnings decreases when interim earnings are introduced. 
Arbel and Strebel [1982,1983] provide empirical evidence 
suggesting that firms with low levels of analyst following (measured by 
the number of analysts forecasting a firm’s earnings) earn higher 
risk-adjusted returns. Moreover,for companies of similar size, the 
neglected firms significantly outperform the highly followed ones (Arbel 
and Strebel [1983]) Hence, analysts following appears to dominate the 
small firm effect. Bhushan [1989] analyses the major determinants of the 
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number of analysts following a firm, and finds this variable to be 
positively related to the percentage of institutional holding in the 
firm’s ownership structure, as well as to firm size and the correlation 
between the firm’s returns and the market return, but negatively related 
to the number of lines of business of the firm. 
Divergence of analyst opinion is another potential surrogate for 
the amount of relevant information available. Using the premise that 
g 
Financial Aanlysts Forecasts (FAF) might proxy for market expectations , 
Barry and Brown [1984] suggest that divergence of analyst opinion be used 
as a proxy for ex-ante earnings uncertainty. Moreover, Barry and Brown 
[1985] develop a theoretical model to show that the divergence of opinion 
is a decreasing function of the quality of information available. 
Callahan, Elgers and Strock [1987] have used the cross-sectional 
dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts as one proxy for the firm’s 
information environment. However, they have cautioned that the 
usefulness of this measure may be affected by outdated forecasts because 
analysts are not required to revise or confirm their forecasts at each 
report week. In a recent study, Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift [1991] report 
evidence of a significant positive association between the dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings per share and the volume of 
trading. The authors conclude that the degree of heterogeneity in 
beliefs, measured by the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, is a 
determinant of the intensity of trading. Morse, Stephan and St ice [1991] 
examine the effect of an annual earnings announcement on the dispersion 
of analysts’one-year-ahead forecasts. Interestingly, the authors find 
that forecasts become more dispersed than would be expected in the 
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absence of an earnings announcement. Using the premise that an 
explanation for their empirical results is the nonsynchronous updating of 
forecasts by analysts, the authors partition their sample on the length 
of time between the announcement date and the next IBES (Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System) report into short-lag and long-lag groups and 
find a much higher number of forecast revisions for the latter group than 
for the former. The authors conclude that partitioning of their sample 
in this manner provides a more accurate measure of changes in the 
dispersion of forecasts due to an earnings announcement. 
Richardson [1984] hypothesizes that as the correlation between 
firm cash flows and the overall state of the economy (measured, say, by 
the gross national product) increases, macro information increasingly 
tends to preempt the information contained in a firm-spocific signal. 
2 
Using the R of the market model as a surrogate of the extent of prior 
information available due to macro information sources, Richardson shows 
that the price reaction to earnings varies inversely with the 
2 
market-model R . 
2.5 Conclusion 
From our earlier review of the relevant literature, researchers 
appear to be in general agreement that an important variable in the 
firm’s dividend decision is the informational or signalling value of an 
unexpected dividend change. Moreover, the Differential Information 
literature suggests that the informational value of a firm-specific 
signal would essentially be a function of the firm’s information 
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environment. A summary of the studies reviewed in this Chapter appears 
in Appendix A (pages 149 to 160). 
We now turn to formalizing the research questions pertaining to 
the major objective of this study - namely, an examination of the 
informational content of dividend initiation announcements in the context 
of the firm’s information environment. 
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Chapter 2 Endnotes 
1. Actually, formal signalling theory appears to have been first 
formulated by Michael Spence [1973] in the context of the labour 
market. The potential for signalling arises whenever the sellers of a 
commodity know more about its quality than the buyers. Hence, those 
with superior products have an incentive to convincingly "signal" their 
high quality to the market in order to command a higher price. In the 
absence of such signals, unable to distinguish quality differences, 
buyers offer a price that reflects only their perception of average 
quality. 
2. Such as Bhattacharya [1979], Hakansson [1982], Miller and Rock [1985], 
John sind Williams [1985], Ambarish, John and Williams [1987]. 
3. See Ang [1987] for a full discussion. 
4. See Ang [1987]. 
5. See, for instance Blank [1976], Jensen and Meckling [1976], and Myers 
[1977]. 
6. Earlier papers by Eades, Hess and Kim [1985] and Kalay and Lowenstein 
[1985] have provided similar evidence. 
7. However, Bajaj and Vijh [1990], examine the market’s response to all 
regular dividend announcements without any ex-post selection and 
document significantly higher positive excess returns for small firms. 
The authors view their findings as anomalous in the light of existing 
theories of asset pricing. 
8. The notion that FAF might proxy for market expectations gains support 
from the study of Elton, Gruber and Gultekin [1981] which shows that 
FAF have a substantial influence on stock prices. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
3.1 Informational Effects of Dividend Initiations 
A number of studies have documented evidence indicating that 
dividend initiation announcements convey significant new information to 
the market. For instance, the seminal work by Asquith and Mullins [1983] 
finds the average two-day excess return on firms initiating cash 
dividends to be much higher than for the largest subsequent increase in 
cash dividends by the sampled firms. The results reported in more recent 
papers by Healy and Palepu [1988] and Venkatesh [1989] have corroborated 
these findings of information content in dividend initiations. 
The first step in the formulation of this study, therefore, is to 
ascertain whether the experience of the sample firms is similar overall 
to that of previous work on dividend initiations. This is done by 
examining whether the sample of dividend initiation announcements being 
examined conveys unexpected information to the market on average. For 
this purpose, the following research question is addressed 
Are dividend initiation announcements associated with significant 
positive abnormal share price reactions? 
The price reaction is defined as the magnitude of the Mean Standardized 
Abnormal Returns (MSAR) over the two day "event-period" comprising of the 
37 
day the news regarding the dividend initiation announcement is published 
in the Wall Street Journal (denoted by t=0) and the previous day, since, 
often, news is transmitted over the Broad Tape on this day (Asquith and 
Mullins [1983]). This suggests 
Hypothesis 1 
Dividend Initiation announcements are associated with significant 
positive MSAR. 
3.2 Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment: Price 
Effects 
The second issue being addressed in the study is whether the 
magnitude of security price reaction to a dividend initiation 
announcement is systematically associated with the firm’s information 
environment. More specifically, our research question is 
Is there an inverse association between the magnitude 
of security price reaction to a dividend initiation 
announcement and the firm’s information environment? 
This research question is addressed by examining the relative 
information content of a given dividend initiation across different 
firm-specific information environments. The premise is that the 
information content per unit of a given dividend initiation should be 
more for a "low information environment" firm relative to a "high 
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information environment" firm, which in turn should generate relatively 
higher price reactions for the "low information environment" firms. The 
firm’s information environment is defined in terms of the extent of 
firm-specific information available in the public domain immediately 
prior to the dividend initiation announcement. 
In the process of examining the research issues pertaining to 
the role of the firm’s information environment in determining the 
magnitude of stock price reactions to dividend initiations, the study 
focuses on the size of the dividend yield, given by the dividend amount, 
deflated by the price of the stock, rather than the absolute magnitude of 
the initiation. Standardizing the dividend in this manner becomes 
necessary in the light of documented evidence that, often, firm-specific 
characteristics are associated with the price of the firm’s stock. For 
instance, Kross [1985] has shown that "low" market capitalization firms 
also tend to have lower priced stocks. Hence, the premise of the study 
is that the size of dividend yield may be a more appropriate measure than 
the absolute magnitude of the dividend initiation. 
Our second research question yields the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2 
The lower the firm’s information environment, the higher will be 
the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend announcement. 
Since, the firm’s information environment cannot be directly 
observed, the practice among empirical studies in this area has been to 
define and use proxy variables. One variable which has been extensively 
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applied is market capitalization, on the premise that the amount of 
prior information available about a firm’s activities as well as the 
number of informed and participating traders are an increasing function 
of the capitalized value of the firm. Recent studies which have 
investigated the informational effects of regular dividend announcements 
in the context of asymmetrical information environments have all used 
2 
market capitalization to proxy for the firm’s information environment. 
Their findings suggest that the information content of regular dividend 
announcements is negatively related to firm size. The evidence presented 
in Bajaj and Vijh [1990], however, sheds a controversial light on these 
findings. Bajaj and Vijh examine the market’s response to all regular 
dividend announcements without any ex-post selection and document 
significantly higher positive excess returns for small firms. The 
authors view their findings as anomalous in the light of existing 
theories of asset pricing. Our study contends that Bajaj and Vijh’s 
findings should not apply to dividend initiations which, unlike 
subsequent dividend announcements, are not regular predictable events. 
We, therefore, posit that 
Hypothesis 2A 
The lower the firm’s market capitalization, the higher will be 
the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend announcement. 
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Large institutions usually tend to exclude equity holdings in low 
market capitalization firms from their investment portfolios. The 
reason, as suggested by Richardson [1984], is that by imposing a cut-off 
on equity investments based on market capitalization, institutions shield 
against liquidity problems that may arise by taking a large position in 
the stock of a small firm. This reasoning suggests that the percentage 
of institutional holding in a firm’s equity as well as the number of 
institutions holding the firm’s equity may both be viable measures of its 
information environment. Hence, the following hypotheses pertain to 
these proxy variables 
Hypothesis 2B 
The lower the percentage of institutional holding in the firm’s 
equity, the higher will be the MSAR associated with a given 
initial dividend announcement. 
Hypothesis 2C 
The lower the number of institutions holding the firm’s equity 
the higher will be the MSAR associated with a given initial 
dividend announcement. 
The extent of institutional holding in the firm has a direct 
bearing on its level of analyst following, since analysts tend to follow 
stocks that are held by institutions. Richardson [1984] observes that 
large institutions are major customers of private information produced by 
analysts in brokerage firms. If convexities exist in the cost functions 
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of analysts, they might choose not to follow firms which are not held by 
institutions because the expected commission revenues from selling 
information do not match up with the initial fixed cost involved in 
getting acquainted with the firm. Typically, therefore, one might expect 
analysts to ignore smaller firms which are shunned by institutional 
investors due to liquidity problems. However, Arbel and Strebel 
([1982],[1983]) have provided empirical evidence to show that firms with 
low levels of analyst following earn higher risk-adjusted returns even 
after controlling for size. This suggests that the "neglected firm 
effect", caused by low levels of analyst following, may, in some 
instances, dominate over the "firm-size" effect documented in Reinganum 
[1982]. Hence, as a proxy measure for the firm’s information 
environment, the number of analysts following variable may add to the 
explanatory value of the market capitalization variable. This suggests 
the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 2D 
The lower the number of analysts following in the firm the higher 
will be the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend 
announcement. 
Richardson [1984] observes that as the correlation between the 
firm’s cash flows and the overall state of the economy (measured, say, by 
the gross national product) increases, macro information increasingly 
tends to preempt the information contained in a firm-specific signal. 
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This suggests that the amount of prior information about the individual 
firm available from macro information sources may, at least, in part 
define the firm’s information environment. Richardson uses the R of the 
market model as a surrogate for the correlation between the firm’s 
2 
earnings and macro-economic earnings. Essentially the R reflects the 
underlying correlation between changes in the consensus estimates of firm 
value and changes in the market index of stock prices. We posit that 
Hypothesis 2E 
2 
The lower the estimation period market model R the higher will be 
the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend announcement. 
The discussion so far suggests that the five proxy variables 
enumerated above - namely, market capitalization, percentage of 
institutional equity holding, number of institutions holding the firm’s 
equity, number of analysts following, and the estimation period market 
2 
model R - should reflect, in varying degrees, the amount of publicly 
available information about the firm. However, a full definition of the 
firm’s information environment should encompass not only the amount of 
publicly available information but also the quality of such information. 
If the information available results in heterogenous beliefs, then the 
information environment is qualitatively weak since it generates 
uncertainty. Barry and Brown [1985] develop a theoretical model to show 
that divergence of opinion is a decreasing function of the quality of 
information available. Moreover, using the premise that the forecasts 
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produced by financial analysts might proxy for market expectations, Barry 
and Brown [1984] suggest that divergence of analyst opinion be used as a 
surrogate for ex-ante earnings uncertainty. A number of recent empirical 
examinations into this issue of heterogeneity in investor beliefs have 
used the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts to proxy for the 
diversity of investor beliefs about future earnings. For instance, the 
findings of Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift [1991] suggest that the degree of 
heterogeneity in beliefs, measured by the dispersion of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, is a determinant of the intensity of trading. To 
examine the impact of qualitative differences in the information 
environment on the magnitude of share price reactions to dividend 
initiation announcements, we formulate 
Hypothesis 2F 
The higher the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts the 
higher will be the MSAR associated with a given initial dividend 
announcement. 
3.3 Dividend Initiations and the Information Environment: Volatility 
Effects 
This study also addresses the issue of whether the volatility of 
security price reaction to a dividend initiation announcement is 
systematically associated with the firm’s information environment. Kalay 
and Lowenstein [1985] document substantial increases in the volatility of 
security returns for the days surrounding the dividend announcement, 
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largely due to high levels of uncertainty during such periods. Patel1 
and Wolfson [1979] and Christie [1983] also report that stock returns are 
more volatile around other regularly scheduled announcements. This study 
contends that the increase in "event period" returns volatility should 
also be a function of the firm’s information environment. More 
specifically, our research question is 
Is there an inverse association between the volatility of 
security price reaction to a dividend initiation announcement and 
the firm’s information environment? 
The volatility of security price reaction connotes the existence 
of uncertainty or risk. In this context, the variance of the probability 
distribution of the return on assets is used to measure risk. Variance 
measures the dispersion of probable returns to investors around the mean 
or expected return at the end of the investment holding period. This 
suggests the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis 3 
The lower the firm’s information environment, the higher will be 
the variance or increase in variance during dividend initiation 
announcements. 
Tests of this hypothesis are conducted in the context of the information 
environment proxy variables in the manner discussed in Section 3.2 above. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
The hypotheses developed in this Chapter represent the central 
focus of the research issues being examined in this dissertation. They 
are tested using the data and methodology discusssed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Endnotes 
1. The theoretical discussion is given in Verrechia [1979] and Atiase 
[1980]. 
2. The studies are by Mangiero [1988], Eddy and Seifert [1988], and Brown, 
Choi and Kim [1989]. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SAMPLE, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
Exchange firms that initiated regular dividend payments during 
the period January 1976 to December 1987 were identified from the CRSP 
1 
(Center for Research on Security Prices) daily master files. The 
announcement dates were cross-checked with the Moody’s Annual Dividend 
Record and/or the Wall Street Journal Index. The following additional 
screens were applied to the dividend initiating firms 
(i) The firms should have had a complete history of daily returns 
available on the CRSP tapes for a 100-day period prior to the 
announcement date and contained no missing observations over the 
week of the announcement. This restriction was imposed in order to 
ensure the availability of sufficient daily returns observations for 
the statistical computations pertaining to abnormal price reactions. 
(ii) The firms should have had no earnings announcement, stock split 
announcements or other "confounding" event within a ten-day window 
2 
surrounding the dividend announcement. The ten-day confounding 
event filter was applied to "isolate" the dividend information (Kwan 
[1981]), and thereby minimize any ambiguity associated with an 
observed security price reaction at the time of the dividend 
initiation announcement. 
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Table 1 
TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS MADE BY THE 
SAMPLE OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE PERIOD 1976-1987. 
Year Number of Firms 
1976 17 
1977 10 
1978 4 
1979 5 
1980 5 
1981 3 
1982 1 
1983 4 
1984 4 
1985 6 
1986 5 
1987 16 
Total 80 
(iii) The ten-day confounding event filter was also applied to remove any 
3 
firms which had an ex-dividend day within the "screen" period. 
This process yielded a "clean" sample of 80 dividend initiating 
4 
firms over the 12 year time-frame. Details of the temporal break up of 
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these firms Eire provided in Table 1 (on previous page). From the table, 
we note that there is a sizeable clustering of firm-events in the years 
1976, 1977 ajid 1987. The relatively large number of observations in the 
yesir 1987 could, at least, in psirt have been motivated by the Tax Reform 
legislation of 1986 under which capital gains are taxed at the same rates 
as ordinary income from regular dividends. 
4.2 The Dividend Expectation Model 
The "naive" expectations model is used according to which any 
change in dividends is unexpected. This model is premised on the 
assumption that the best prediction of dividends in time "q" made in time 
"q-1" is the dividend paid at time "q-1". The model is denoted by the 
following equation 
D*=D (1) 
q q-1 
where D equals the dividend per share in the qthquarter, D is the 
q q-i 
dividend per share in the previous quEirter, Eind the asterisk denotes an 
expectations operator. 
Given equation (1), the measure of unanticipated dividends at 
time "q", denoted by Du, is therefore the percentage difference between 
q 
the actual dividend Einnounced for the qth quarter and the expected 
dividend for that quarter. This is shown as follows 
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D 
u 
q 
(2) 
D 
q 
or, Du= —— - 1 
q D 
q 
(3) 
Substituting D 
we get 
q-l 
for D 
q 
from equation (1) and applying to equation (3), 
D 
q 
q-l 
1 (4) 
From equation (4), the measure of unanticipated dividends, denoted by Du, 
q 
is shown to be the percentage change in dividends from the previous 
quarter. 
According to Asquith and Mullins [1983], this model is more 
likely to accurately reflect investor expectations for initial dividends, 
since such dividends are more likely to be unexpected (Asquith and 
5 
Mullins [1983]) than subsequent regular dividends. Thus our 
hypothesized dividend effects should be most visible at initiation. 
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4.3 Data Sources for the Information Environment Proxy Measures 
The next step is to delineate the "firms-events" according to 
their information environments. The proxy variables, and their 
respective data sources, are described below. 
(i) Size 
Following Atiase [1985] and Bhushan [1989], in this study market 
capitalization is used as a surrogate for firm-size. It is defined 
as the market value of common equity at the end of the month 
immediately prior to the month of the dividend initiation 
announcement. The relevant data is obtained from the CRSP daily 
master tape. 
(ii) Number of Institutions Holding the Firm’s Equity 
The number of common shares held by institutions in the 
pre-announcement month was obtained from the Standard & Poors Stock 
Guide. 
(iii) Percentage of Institutional Equity Holding 
The percentage of institutional equity holding is computed as 
follows: 
The aggregate number of shares held by institutions 
in the pre-announcement month. 
___ X 100. 
The total outstanding common stock 
of the firm. 
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(iv) Number of Analysts Following 
Arbel and Strebel [1982, 1983] have shown that the "neglected 
firm effect", caused by low levels of analyst following, may, in some 
instances, dominate over the "firm-size" effect. Hence, the number 
of analysts following a firm may be a stronger measure of the extent 
of prior firm-specific information available than its market 
capitalization. 
We define this measure as the number of analysts reporting 
earnings forecasts for the firm in the month immediately preceding 
the month of the dividend initiation announcement. The data is 
obtained from the IBES tapes. 
(v) Correlation Between Firm-Earnings and Macro Economy-wide 
Earnings 
2 
The market model R is used as an information environment proxy 
measure, based on Richardson’s [1984] premise (see also Bhushan 
2 
[1989]) that a signal emitted by the management of a low R firm will 
be less preempted by macro information, making it relatively more 
informative to investors than a similar signal provided by the 
2 
management of a high R firm. 
(vi) Dispersion of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts 
This proxy, it is premised, will capture qualitative differences 
across information environments since it connotes the existence of 
CJ 
heterogenous beliefs. Such differences may not be fully reflected 
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This measure is in the other proxy measures discussed earlier, 
represented by the standard deviation around the mean earnings 
forecast provided by the IBES data tape deflated by the absolute 
value of the mean forecast, for the month immediately prior to the 
month of the dividend initiation announcement. 
Brown, Richardson and Schwager [1987] observe that a 
potential problem with the IBES dispersion measure is that the 
forecasts used to calculate dispersion may not be contemporaneous 
since the dates of the forecasts tend to vary. The problem is not 
severe if the age distribution of the forecasts is random cross¬ 
sect ionally. Unfortunately, the severity of the problem cannot be 
ascertained as the age distribution of the forecasts is not given in 
the IBES tapes. Another potential problem, discussed in O’Brien 
[1988] and Morse, Stephan and Stice [1991], is the nonsynchronous 
recording of analyst forecasts updates in the IBES data set. O’Brien 
finds an average delay of 34 trading days between a forecast update 
g 
by analysts and its inclusion in the IBES tapes. According to 
Morse, Stephan and Stice, this delay in the inclusion of analysts’ 
forecast updates in the IBES Summary History tape poses serious 
problems in using estimates of the variance of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts to measure the divergence of beliefs. For instance, if an 
announcement causes all analysts to increase their forecasts by two 
dollars, there would be no change in the variance of analysts’ 
forecasts. However, if only one-half of the analyst updates are 
reflected in the IBES tapes, in a given month, an user of this data 
base will find an apparent increase in the variance of forecasts in 
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that month followed by a corresponding decrease when the analyst 
updates do get incorporated into the IBES data set in a subsequent 
month. 
The information environment proxy variables, pertaining to our 
sample of 80 dividend initiation announcements, are calibrated in Table 2 
(on the next page). We note, from the Table, that market capitalization 
ranges from 9.31 million to 3530.30 million, the percentage of 
institutional equity holding ranges from 0 to 69, the number of 
institutions holding equity goes from 0 to a high of 215, and the 
2 
estimation period market model R ranges from a low of 0.00004 to a high 
of 0.69. For the Number of Analysts Following proxy, data was not 
available for 17 firms on the IBES tapes. Hence a two stage procedure 
was followed in our analysis with regard to this proxy. In the first 
stage, all the original 80 firm-event observations were included and we 
assumed that the 17 firms, for which data was not available on the IBES 
tapes, had no analyst following. In the second stage, we excluded the 17 
firms on the premise that there was insufficient information about the 
extent of analyst following for these firms. Table 2 presents 
descriptive statistics for both of our samples of the Number of Analysts 
Following proxy. We note that the range for both samples is from 0 to 
16. 
4.4 Summary 
This Chapter describes the manner in which the final sample of 
dividend initiation announcements was compiled, provides a temporal 
distribution of this sample and discusses the rationale for using the 
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Table-2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT PROXY VARIABLES, 
NAMELY % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE 
ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS 
FOLLOWING (ANLST), IN THE CONTEXT OF DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS BY 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-87. 
SAMPLE SIZE MEAN STD.DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
INST 80 0. 12 0. 15 0.00 0.69 
MKT.CAP 
($ Millions) 
80 224.98 549.45 9.31 3530.30 
NINST 80 23.63 35.07 0.00 215.00 
R2 80 0. 14 0. 13 0.00004 0.69 
ANLST*(all firms) 80 1.94 3.03 0.00 16.00 
ANLST**(IBES listed 63 2.46 3.22 0. 00 16.00 
firms) 
* The sample includes 17 firms not listed by IBES and assumed to have no 
analyst following. 
** The sample excludes firms not listed by IBES, on the premise that 
there is insufficient information about the number of analysts 
following these firms. 
"naive" expectations model to measure the magnitude of the 
"unanticipated" dividend. The data sources for the six information 
environment proxy measures being examined in this study are described, 
and relevant descriptive statistics tabulated. 
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In Chapter 5, we provide a description of the statistical tests 
that are employed for an empirical examination of the data described in 
this Chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Endnotes 
1. The year 1976 was selected as the earliest year for the study because 
the IBES data base, which was used to obtain data for two of the 
information environment proxy measures - namely, the number of analysts 
following in the firm and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts - begins from this year. 
2. Our selection of a "10 day" screen conforms to previous studies such as 
Asquith and Mullins [1983], 
3. Eades, Hess and Kim [1985] note that occurrence of an ex-dividend day 
in the event period leads to a significant positive excess return. 
4. This final sample of dividend initiation announcements is, henceforth, 
called "firm-events". 
5. Asquith and Mullins [1983] also observe that while other models (such 
as the Fama-Babiak [1968] Earnings-based model) may produce superior 
forecasts for a variable past series of dividends, such models collapse 
into the "naive" model when confronted with a constant past series of 
dividends. 
6. If the prior information results in heterogenous beliefs, then the 
firm’s information environment is qualitatively poor as it causes 
uncertainty (Barry and Brown [1984, 1985]). 
7. The earlier measures should proxy the amount of prior information 
available and may not reflect qualitative differences in such 
information. 
8. The 34 trading day lag, in O’Brien’s findings, has a standard deviation 
of 44.5 days, indicating a highly skewed distribution. 
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CHAPTER 5 
METHODOLOGY: A DESCRIPTION OF THE STATISTICAL TESTS 
The study is conducted using three overall categories of 
statistical tests. These are, respectively, the analysis of returns for 
the individual information environment proxies, regression analysis, and 
the analysis of volatility. 
The information environment proxy variables are individually 
ranked in ascending order. Then the sampled "firm-events" are classified 
into low, medium and high information environment levels and assigned to 
1 
one of different "information environment portfolios" for the purpose of 
testing the hypotheses of the study. 
5.1 The Analyses of Returns 
Tests of the "price reaction" hypothesis are conducted by 
measuring abnormal returns around dividend initiation announcements. For 
each "firm-event" the market model, which adjusts for both market and 
risk effects, is used to calculate an abnormal return (AR) for event day 
t as follows 
R 
it 
(a + R ) 
i i mt 
(1) 
where R is the rate of return on "firm-event" i for event day t, R is 
it mt 
the rate of return on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
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value-weighted index on event day t, and 0 are the intercept and the 
slope coefficients of the market model regression, which is run over an 
estimation period from t=-90 to t=-31. These estimates provide unbiased 
estimates of the expected daily return of the security relative to the 
"firm-event 
The abnormal return, as defined, is equal to the error term, e , 
which occurs in the regression equation 
E(R ) = ct + 0 R (2) 
it i i mt 
and represents the difference between observed and expected returns. The 
market model does not, however, provide for shifts in Beta that may occur 
as a result of the event under study. Because the coefficients are 
assumed to remain constant (stable) across time and events, this model 
may not accurately measure the abnormal return if there is a shift in the 
security’s risk class (see Fama [1976]). Despite these limitations, this 
model is widely used in event studies, because "there is no evidence that 
more complicated methodologies convey any (additional) benefit" (Brown 
and Warner [1980]). 
The study concentrates on an examination of daily returns data as 
this allows for the explicit identification and control of 
contemporaneous confounding events (Aharony and Swary [1980]), and 
thereby increases the power of the statistical tests (Brown and Warner 
[1980] [1985]). 
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Abnormal returns and mean standardized abnormal returns are 
calculated for each "firm-event" over the interval -30 to +30 (t=-l,0 is 
the "event-period"). Standardizing the abnormal returns provides a zero 
mean and unit variance for each cross-section, thereby satisfying the 
requirements for the t-test and F-test. The test statistic described by 
Brown and Warner [1985] is the t-statistic relative to the Mean 
Standardized Abnormal Returns. For each day in the period t= -10 to t= 
2 
+10 the test statistic is given by 
t-statistic = SAR / s (3) 
t t p 
A 
where, SAR is the mean standardized abnormal return at time t, and s is 
t p 
the estimated standard deviation of the mean standardized abnormal 
3 
returns over the period t=-90 to -31. The statistic is distributed as 
Student's "t" with n-1 degrees of freedom where n represents the number 
of days over the estimation period. 
To test for a significant difference between the MSAR’s of two 
quintile distributions (say, 1 and 2) on any day in the "event period" 
(t=—1,0), the test-statistic is 
t-statistic = (AR - AR )/ 
l,t=0,-l 2,t=o,-1 
/7~ 
pi 
+ s - 2s 
p2 pl2 
(4) 
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A 
where, s and s are the quintile 1 and quintile 2 standard deviations 
pi p2 
of the MSAR’s over the estimation-period comprising of n days, and s 
pl2 
is defined as 
s = ( V [AR - AR ] [AR - AR ])/ n-1 (5) 
pl2 ^ l,t 1 2,t 2 
t=-90 
This test statistic,too, has the Student’s "t" distribution. 
To examine the Mean Standardized Abnormal Returns over various 
intervals during the period t=-10 to t=+10 the test statistic is the 
4 _ 
standardized mean cumulative abnormal return (SCAR). For firm-event i 
5 
over the interval t= T ,.,T the statistic is denoted as 
1 i 2i 
T2i 
SCAR = Z SZAR / 
i it 
t=T 
li 
For a sample of N firm-events, the test statistic is 
/ (T 
2i 
- T 
li 
+ 1) 
(6) 
N 
Z = V SCAR / /~N 
u i 
i =1 
(7) 
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As noted before, each SAR.^ is assumed to be distributed unit normal in 
the absence of abnormal performance. Under this assumption, Z is also 
unit normal. 
5.2 Regression Analysis 
The univariate tests described above may mask interaction effects 
across the information environment proxy measures that could impact the 
results. Moreover, an objective of the study is to statistically identify 
the proxy variable(s) which best explain(s) the magnitude of security 
price reaction at the time of dividend initiation announcement. Hence, 
the following cross-sectional regression model is estimated for each 
firm-event SCAR pertaining to the event-period, t=-l,0 
SCAR = 13 + /3 * LUDiv + 0 * LMKT. CAP + (3 * LINST + |3 * LNINST 
i 0 1 12 13 14 i 
+ 13 * LANLST + 13 * LDISP + /3 * LCORR + e (8) 
' 5 16 17 11 
where, 
SCAR = Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns for firm-event i in the 
i 
event period, t=-l,0. 
LUDivi = Natural log of "Unexpected" Dividend Initiation Yield amount 
pertaining to each firm i. 
LMKT. CAPi = Natural log of the market value of equity of each firm i. 
LINSTi = Natural log of the percentage of institutional holding in each 
firm i. 
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LNINST^ = Natural log of the number of institutions holding firm i’s 
equity. 
LANLST^ = Natural log of the number of analysts following firm i. 
LDISP^ = Natural log of the standard deviation around the mean earnings 
forecast deflated by the mean forecast, for each firm i. 
2 
LCORR^ = The R from the estimation period market model regression for 
firm i. 
e^= The error term in the regression equation for each firm i. 
The natural log transformations of the independant variables serve to 
provide linear estimates. The simple linear model specified above is 
estimated on the computer software package SHAZAM using ordinary least 
squares regression. The results are compared with the results obtained 
from separate univariate regression estimates with the two day (t=-l,0) 
Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return as the dependant variable and the 
natural log of each information environment proxy variable as well as 
dividend yield as the independant variable. The independant variables 
are scrutinized for multicollinearity by examining the correlation matrix 
involving each of the explanatory variables. 
Two other variants of the linear model outlined above are also 
estimated and analyzed. In the first auxiliary regression model, the 
explanatory variables remain as defined earlier. The dependant variable, 
however, is now the absolute value of the two day (t=—1,0) Standardized 
Cumulative Abnormal Return. This analysis, exploratory in nature, 
attempts to investigate the role of the independant variables in 
explaining the absolute magnitude of the two day Standardized Cumulative 
64 
Abnormal Return. The second regression model is estimated using only the 
positive Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return observations. The 
theoretical underpinning of our hypotheses detailed in section above 
suggests that, in general, dividend initiation announcements are 
associated with statistically significant positive abnormal returns. 
Hence, theoretically, none of the two day (t=—1,0) Standardized 
Cumulative Abnormal Return observations should be negative. It would, 
therefore, be interesting to statistically analyze the role of the 
independant variables in explaining the magnitude of only the positive 
two day Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns. 
5.3 Analysis of Volatility 
The "volatility" hypothesis tests for an increase in "event 
period" volatility relative to the "estimation period" in order to 
determine whether the increase is significantly higher for the "low" 
information environment firms. For each information environment 
portfolio, volatility (denoted as o*2) is computed for each firm i as 
follows 
<r2= [ Z (R - R )2 ]/N 
t=i 
(9) 
where 
R^= the returns over period t, 
R = the average return over period t 
N = the number of observations. 
N 
(given by Z Rt/N )» 
t=i 
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Hence, for the estimation period, volatility is computed for each firm 
over days t= -90,-31, whereas for the event period volatility is computed 
over days t= -3,0. Thereafter, for each portfolio, individual firm 
estimation period and event period volatilities are totalled and average 
volatilities are computed by dividing the summations by the number of 
firms in the portfolio. 
To examine differences between average estimation period and 
2 2 
event period variances, the volatility ratio given by <r /<r is 
eve est 
2 2 
computed, where cr is the average event period variance, and <r is 
eve est 
the average estimation period variance for each portfolio. For a 
detailed comparative assessment of estimation period and event period 
variances for individual firms within each portfolio, the ratios of these 
variances are also computed for each firm-event observation. 
5.4 Conclusion 
The statistical methodology described in this Chapter is used to 
analyze the data discussed in Chapter 4 with the objective of testing the 
hypotheses detailed in Chapter 3. In the next Chapter, we turn to a 
presentation of our empirical findings. 
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Chapter 5 Endnotes 
1. A drawback of this approach is that it implicitly assumes that all 
firms within a portfolio are homogenous in terms of prior information 
availability, and therefore fails to recognize possible cross- 
sectional differences in the magnitude of the information measures 
within each portfolio (Lobo and Mahmoud [1989]). 
2. This period includes the event period of t=-l,0. 
3. The standard deviation of the mean standardized abnormal returns over 
the estimation period is computed as follows 
-31 
and, AR = £ 1/n-l AR 
t 
t=-90 
where, n = the number of days over the estimation period. 
4. This statistic is fully described in Hite and Owers [1983] and Dodd and 
Warner [1983]. 
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5. SZAR.^ is computed by standardizing the abnormal return AR.t as 
foilows: 
SZAR = AR / s , where, 
it it it 
s = 
it 
+ 1 + (R 
D 
mt 
D. 
/ Z (R - 
mTT 
71=1 
R )2 ), where 
i 
2 
s, = residual variance of security i from the market model regression, 
= range of observations during the estimation period, 
R = rate of return on the market index for day t of the event period, 
mt 
R = mean rate of return on the market index during the estimation period, 
m 
R = rate of return on the market for day n of the estimation period. 
mTT 
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The results obtained from our empirical analyses are presented in 
this Chapter. First, our examination centers on the analysis of abnormal 
returns for the overall sample of dividend initiation announcements as 
well as for the subsamples of individual portfolios created for the 
respective information environment proxies. Thereafter, the focus of the 
study shifts to the analysis of the volatility of returns for the 
individual portfolios within each information environment proxy. The 
i 
results of the regression analysis are then reported. The Chapter ends 
with a comparative evaluation of the information environment proxy 
variables. 
6.1 Analysis of Returns 
6.1.1 Abnormal Returns Study for Overall Sample 
The first step in the analysis was to examine the magnitude of 
abnormal returns relative to the entire sample of 80 dividend initiation 
announcements. Table 3 (on the following page) reports the average market 
adjusted abnormal returns (AR), the cumulative sum of the daily average 
abnormal return (CAR), the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days 
before to 10 days after the dividend initiation announcement, for this 
sample. We note that the two day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR is 
2.19% with a z-statistic of 5.08, which is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. Over 84% of this two-day CAR accrues on day -1, when the 
AR is 1.84% with a t-value of 6.27, which again is statistically 
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Table-3 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 80 
10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS OVER THE PERIOD 1976-87. 
Panel A : Daily Residuals. 
Date in 
event time 
AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) % Positive 
-10 0.46 0.46 1.26 50 
-9 -0.22 0.24 -0.61 44 
-8 0.66 0.90 1.83 50 
-7 0.25 1. 15 0.67 47 
-6 -0.05 1. 10 -0. 13 46 
-5 0.22 1.32 0.59 50 
-4 0.01 1.33 0.03 44 
-3 0.88 2.21 2.47 51 
-2 0.03 2.24 0.08 49 
-1 1.84 4.08 
* 
6.27 75 
0 
* significant at the 
0.35 
.01 level of 
4.43 
confidence. 
0.95 52 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in 
event time 
CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
-1 to 0 2. 19 5.08* 
+ 1 to +2 0.34 1.22 
+ 1 to +5 1.50 2.84 
+1 to +10 
* significant at the 
2.25 
.01 level of confidence. 
2.85 
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significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, 75% of the average ARs are 
1 
positive on this day. As reported in earlier studies , much of the 
impact of the dividend initiation announcement appears to have been 
captured on the day before publication in the Wall Street Journal since 
the news is transmitted over the Broad Tape on that day. From Table 3 we 
also see that while the ARs for days -10 through -2 are insignificant, 
there is potentially some leakage of information on day -3 when the AR is 
0.88 with a t-value of 2.47. Overall, it is clear from Table 3 that 
dividend initiation announcements appear to be associated with highly 
significant abnormal returns. 
6.1.2 Information Environment Proxy Data Portfolio Formation and 
Abnormal Returns 
We next sought to examine whether the magnitude of security 
returns relative to the dividend initiation announcement had an inverse 
association with the firm’s information environment. For this purpose, 
the analysis was conducted with the five proxy measures for the firm’s 
information environment - namely, the percentage of institutional equity 
holding, market capitalization, the number of institutions holding the 
2 
firm’s equity, the estimation period market model R , and the number of 
analysts following. Owing to limitations of data availability, we were 
unable to form separate portfolios for the dispersion of analysts’ 
earnings forecast proxy. Hence, our examination of this proxy was 
confined only to regression analysis and is discussed in detail in 
Section 6.3. 
71 
Table-4 
A PROFILE OF PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING IN 80 EXCHANGE- 
LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN THE MONTH 
PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. 
% of Equity Held by Number of 
Institutions Firms 
0 to 1 18 
over 1 to 3 10 
4 to 7 10 
8 to 10 9 
over 0 to 15 12 
16 to 25 9 
26 to 47 9 
48 to 69 3 
Total 80 
Descriptive statistics for the proxy measures are provided in 
Table 2 on page 56. The results of our analysis for the five information 
environment proxy variables are sequentially provided below. 
6.1.2.1 Percentage of Institutional Equity Holding 
For each firm, the percentage of institutional equity holding was 
computed as of the month-end immediately preceding the month of dividend 
initiation. We classified the firms into low, medium and high 
information environment levels, where 0-10% institutional equity holding 
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was categorised as "low", 10.1-25% as "medium" and above 25% was 
classified as "high". From Table 4, (see previous page) we note that 
while the range of the percentage of institutional equity holding in the 
sample firms goes from 0 to 69, over 85% of the firms fall in the range 
of 0 to 25%, i.e. in the "low" and "medium" ranges. 
We next created two portfolios comprising of the "low" and the 
"medium/high" firms, respectively, with 47 firms grouped in the "low" 
portfolio and 33 firms in the "medium/high" portfolio (Table 5, Panel A, 
on next page gives a detailed breakout of these portfolios). Table 5, 
2 
Panel A also reports the average dividend yield and the dispersion 
around the average dividend yield for the two portfolios. It can be seen 
that the average dividend yield (at 0.01057) for the "low" institutional 
holding portfolio is disproportionately higher than the average yield for 
the "medium/high" portfolio (0.005145), mainly because, on average, the 
3 
"low" institutional holding firms tended to have lower share prices. 
4 
Past studies have documented a positive association between the 
magnitude of the initial dividend and the size of the announcement period 
abnormal returns. Hence, in order to test for systematic differences in 
announcement period abnormal returns across information environments, it 
is necessary to control for the separate confounding impact of the 
magnitude of the dividend yield. This connotes the necessity for similar 
average dividend yields and standard deviations for the two portfolios. 
A scrutiny of the "low" institutional holding portfolio revealed that 
five firms had disproportinately high dividend yields relative to the 
remaining firms in the portfolio. We excluded these firms and 
recomputed the averge dividend yield and standard deviation for this 
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Table 5 
A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO 
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS IN THE MONTH 
BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF 
FIRMS IN WHICH THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS IS BETWEEN 0 TO 10 
(THE LOW % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP). THE OTHER PORTFOLIO COMPRISES 
OF FIRMS IN WHICH THE % OF EQUITY HELD BY INSTITUTIONS RANGES FROM 10.4 
TO 69 (THE MEDIUM AND HIGH % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP). 
PANEL A: PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD. 
Institutional Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Holding Category Firms Average Std.Deviation 
0% to 10% 47 0.01057 0. 014 
Above 10% 33 0.005145 0.0065 
PANEL B: PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD! 
Institutional Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Holding Category Firms Average Std.Deviation 
0% to 10% 42 0.006013 0.0054 
Above 10% 33 0.005145 0.0065 
* After removal of five firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.39 
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
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portfolio. From Table 5, Panel B, (on previous page) it can be seen that 
the average dividend yields and standard deviations for the revised 
portfolios (comprising, now of a total of 75 exchange-1isted firms) are 
much more comparable, although the average dividend yield for the "low" 
institutional holding category (at 0.006013) is still larger than the 
yield for the "medium/high" category ( 0.005145). We assume that the two 
portfolios are similar with respect to the magnitude of dividend yield. 
Hence, the final sample for the purpose of our price-study comprised of 
75 exchange-1isted dividend initiating firms, of which 42 belonged to the 
"low" institutional holding group and 33 belonged to the "medium/high" 
institutional holding group. 
Tables 6 and 7 (on pages 76 and 77, respectively) report the 
average market adjusted abnormal returns (AR), the cumulative sum of the 
daily average abnormal return (CAR), the t-statistic and the z-statistic 
from 10 days before to 10 days after the dividend initiation 
announcement, for the "low" and "medium/high" institutional holding 
groups respectively. From Table 6, the two day (t=-l,0) announcement 
period CAR for the "low" institutional holding portfolio is 3.01% with a 
z-statistic of 4.58, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. Over 85% of this two-day CAR accrues on day -1, when the AR is 
2.56% with a t-value of 6.56, which again is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. From Table 6 we also see that the ARs for days -10 
through -2 are insignificant. Overall, it is clear from Table 6 that 
dividend initiation announcements by "low" institutional holding firms 
appear to be associated with highly significant abnormal returns. 
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Table-6 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’ ) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH 0-10% INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY 
OWNERSHIP (THE LOW % INSTITUTIONAL HOLDING GROUP). 
Panel A: Daily Residuals 
Date in AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
event time 
-10 0.63 0.63 1.26 
-9 -0. 14 0.49 -0.28 
-8 0.90 1.39 1.83 
-7 0. 11 1.50 0.22 
-6 0.35 1.85 0.70 
-5 -0.03 1.82 -0.05 
-4 0. 10 1.92 0.20 
-3 0.65 2.57 1.31 
-2 0.38 2.95 0.76 
-1 2.56 5.51 6.56 
-0 0. 45 5.96 0.90 
* significant at the .01 level of confidence. 
Panel B: Interval Residuals 
Period l in CAR (%) (z-stati 
event time 
* 
-1 to 0 3.01 4.58 
+ 1 to +2 0. 19 0.62 
+ 1 to +5 1.93 2.69 
+ 1 to + 10 2.05 2. 17 
* significant at the .01 level of confidence. 
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Table-7 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 33 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY 
OWNERSHIP RANGING FROM 10.4% TO 69% (THE MEDIUM AND HIGH % INSTITUTIONAL 
HOLDING GROUP). 
Panel A : Daily Residuals. 
Date in AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
event time 
-10 0. 14 0. 14 0.30 
-9 -0.50 -0.36 -1.04 
-8 -0.06 -0.42 -0. 12 
-7 0.64 0.22 1.33 
-6 -0.74 -0.52 -1.57 
-5 0.66 0. 14 1.39 
-4 -0.07 0.07 -0. 13 
-3 1.07 1. 14 2.30 
-2 -0.61 0.53 -1.28 
-1 1.07 1.60 2.30 
0 0. 18 1.78 0.37 
* significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in CAR (%) (z- -statistic) 
event time 
-1 to 0 1.25 2.53* 
+1 to +2 0.68 1.22 
+1 to +5 1.31 1.40 
+1 to +10 2.91 2.03 
* significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
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From Table 7, the two day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for 
the "medium/high" institutional holding group is 1.25% with a z-value of 
2.53, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Here too, 
the major amount of abnormal returns occurs on day -1, when the AR is 
1.07% with a t-value of 2.30 (this value is statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level). Moreover, while generally the ARs appears to be 
insignificant from days -10 through -2, there does appear to be some 
leakage of information on day -3, when the AR is 1.07 with a t-value of 
2.30. 
From Panel A of Table 26 (on page 109) we see that, for both the 
"low" and the "medium/high" portfolios, 76 % of the day -1 individual 
abnormal returns are positive. However, a difference of means test of 
the ARs of the two groups on day t=-l yields a t-statistic of 2.54 which 
is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
In general, a comparative assessment of Tables 6 and 7 reveals 
that the association between dividend initiation announcements and 
abnormal returns appears to be much stronger for the "low" institutional 
holding firms than for the "medium/high" institutional holding firms. 
6.1.2.2 Market Capitalization 
For each of the 80 dividend initiating firms in the sample, the 
amount of market capitalization was computed as of the month-end 
immediately preceding the month of announcement. Firms were classified 
into "low", "medium" or "high" information environments in the following 
manner; firms with market capitalization upto $ 100 million were labelled 
"low", those with market capitalization ranging from $ 100 million to 
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Table-8 
A PROFILE OF THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION (IN DOLLAR MILLIONS) OF 80 
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN 
THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. 
Market Capitalization Number of 
^ Firms 
9 to 25 9 
over 25 to 50 15 
over 50 to 75 13 
over 75 to 100 7 
over 100 to 125 10 
over 125 to 150 8 
over 150 to 175 4 
over 175 to 425 8 
over 425 to 800 0 
over 800 to 1,000 3 
over 1,000 to 4,000 3 
Total 80 
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$ 425 million were categorized as "medium", while firms with market 
capitalization in excess of $ 425 million were classified as "large". 
From Table 2, presented on page 56, we see that the amount of market 
capitalization for the sampled firms ranged from $ 9.310 million to $ 
3,530.30 million. However, we note from Table 8, (on previous page) 
that, similar to the percentage of institutional equity holding proxy, 
the majority (95 %) of the firms were in the "low" and "medium" 
information environment ranges. 
Two portfolios were created comprising of the "low" and the 
"medium/high" market capitalization firms, respectively, with 44 firms 
grouped in the "low" portfolio and 36 firms grouped in the "medium/ high" 
portfolio (Table 9, Panel A, on next page, provides descriptive 
statistics on these portfolios). Table 9, Panel A also reports the 
average dividend yield and the dispersion around the average dividend 
yield for the two portfolios. Once again, the average dividend yield for 
the "low" market capitalization portfolio (0.0107) is almost twice as 
high as the average yield for the "medium/ high" market capitalization 
portfolio (0.006123), mainly because the "low" market capitalization 
g 
firms also tend to have lower priced stocks. To control for the 
separate confounding impact of the magnitude of dividend yield, we 
reexamined the "low" market capitalization portfolio to determine whether 
any firms had disproportionately high dividend yields relative to other 
firms in that portfolio. The scrutiny resulted in the exclusion of 5 
firms from the portfolio. The average dividend yield of these firms at 
0.03983 was 2.24 standard deviations away from the average portfolio 
dividend yield. Table 9, Panel B (on the following page) describes the 
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Table 9 
A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO 
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION IN THE MONTH 
BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF 
FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION BELOW $100 MILLION (THE LOW MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION GROUP). THE OTHER PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS WITH 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION ABOVE $100 MILLION AND BELOW $4,000 MILLION (THE 
MEDIUM AND HIGH MARKET CAPITALIZATION GROUP). 
PANEL A: PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD. 
Market Capitalization Number of Dividend Yield 
Category Firms Average Std.Deviation 
upto $100 million 
(low) 
44 0.01017 0.0130 
above $100 million 
and 36 0.006123 0.0104 
below $4,000 million 
(medium and high) 
PANEL B: PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD. 
Market Capitalization Number of Dividend Yield 
Category Firms Average Std.Deviation 
upto $100 million 
(low) 
39 0.005932 0.0034 
above $100 million 
and 36 0.006123 0.0104 
below $4,000 million 
(medium and high) 
* After removal of five firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.24 
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
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characteristics of the revised portfolios, comprising of 75 firms of 
which 39 represent the "low" market capitalization category and 36 
represent the "high" market capitalization category. From Table 9, Panel 
B we note that the average dividend yields for the two portfolios are 
quite similar, although the average yield for the "low" market 
capitalization portfolio (at 0.005932) is a little lower than the average 
yield for the "medium/high" portfolio (0.006123). 
Tables 10 and 11 report the average market adjusted abnormal 
returns (AR), the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return 
(CAR), the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days 
after the dividend initiation announcement, for the revised "low" and 
"medium/high" market capitalization groups, respectively. As reported in 
Table 10, (on the next page) the two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR 
for the "low" market capitalization portfolio is 3.36% with a z-statistic 
of 5.11, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Most of 
this two-day CAR accrues on day -1 (83.3 %), when the AR is 2.80% with a 
t-value of 7.01, which again is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. Here too, much of the impact of the dividend initiation 
announcement appears to have been captured on the day before publication 
in the Wall Street Journal since the news is transmitted over the Broad 
Tape on that day. From Table 10, we also see that for all of the days 
-10 through -2, the abnormal returns are insignificant. Similar to the 
institutional holding proxy, dividend initiation announcements by "low" 
market capitalization firms also appear to be associated with highly 
significant abnormal returns. 
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Table-10 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 39 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
RANGING FROM $ 9 MILLION TO $ 100 MILLION (THE LOW MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
GROUP). 
Panel A: Daily Residuals. 
Date in 
event time 
AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
-10 0.90 0.90 1.75 
-9 -0.24 0.66 -0.45 
-8 0. 09 0.75 0. 17 
-7 0. 11 0. 86 0.22 
-6 -0.06 0.80 -0. 11 
-5 0.41 1.21 0.79 
-4 0.32 1.53 0.60 
-3 0.72 2.25 1.39 
-2 0.33 2. 58 0.63 
-1 2.80 5.38 7.01* 
0 
* significant at the 
0. 56 
.01 level of 
5.94 
confidence. 
1.07 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in 
event time 
CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
-1 to 0 3.36 5. 11* 
+1 to +2 0. 12 0.23 
+1 to +5 1.49 1.24 
+1 to +10 
* significant at the .01 level of 
2.45 
confidence. 
1.62 
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Table 11 (on page 85) presents a somewhat different picture with 
respect to the "medium/high" market capitalization group. We see that 
the two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for this portfolio is 0.72 % 
with a z-statistic of 1.88, which is statistically significant only at 
the 0.10 level. Much of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1 when the AR is 
0.89% with a t-value of 2.09 (this t-value is statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level). Moreover, while generally the ARs appear to be 
insignificant from days -10 to -2, there appears to be some leakage of 
7 
information (albeit insignificant) on day -3. 
From Panel B of Table 26 we see that 77% of the day -1 individual 
abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio, while 69 % are 
positive for the "medium/high" portfolio. A difference of means test of 
the ARs of the two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded a t-value of 3.29, 
which is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Our analysis of Tables 10 and 11, together with our findings 
reported in Table 26, Panel B, suggests that the association between 
dividend initiation announcements and abnormal returns appears to be much 
stronger for the "low" market capitalization firms than for the 
"medium/high" market capitalization firms. Hence, our preliminary 
conclusions for the market capitalization proxy are similar to (and 
somewhat stronger than) those for the institutional holding proxy. 
6.1.2.3 The Number of Institutions Holding Firm Equity 
As in the case of the percentage of institutional equity holding, 
discussed above, the number of institutions holding the firm’s equity was 
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Table-11 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH 
RANGING FROM $ 100 MILLION TO $ 4,000 MILLION 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION GROUP). 
MARKET CAPITALIZATION 
(THE MEDIUM AND LARGE 
Panel A: Daily Residuals. 
Date in 
event time 
AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
-10 -0. 11 -0. 11 -0.25 
-9 -0.26 -0.37 -0.59 
-8 0.48 0. 11 1.09 
-7 0. 13 0.24 0.29 
-6 -0.09 0. 15 -0.21 
-5 0. 12 0.27 0.27 
-4 -0. 46 -0. 19 -1.04 
-3 0.49 0.39 1. 11 
-2 -0.33 -0 03 -0.74 
-1 0.89 0.86 2.09* 
0 
* Significant at the .10 
-0. 17 
level of confidence. 
0.69 -0.39 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in 
event time 
CAR (%) (z- -statistic) 
-1 to 0 0.72 1.88* 
+1 to +2 0. 52 1.41 
+1 to +5 1.71 2.92* 
+1 to +10 
* significant at the .10 
2. 42 
level of confidence. 
2.67* 
85 
Table-12 
A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY IN 80 
EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN 
THE MONTH PRIOR TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. 
No of Institutions Number of 
Holding Equity Firms 
0 to 1 7 
2 to 5 15 
6 to 10 15 
11 to 15 13 
16 to 25 10 
26 to 40 7 
41 to 50 3 
60 to 85 6 
86 to 100 2 
150 to 215 2 
Total 80 
also computed as of the month-end immediately preceding the month of 
dividend initiation. Firms were classified into low, medium and high 
information environment levels as follows; a range of 0 to 10 
institutions holding the firm’s equity was classified as "low", 11 to 25 
was classified as "medium", and above 25 was categorised as "high". From 
Table 12, (presented above) we see that while the range of the number of 
instututions holding equity in the sampled firms stretches from 0 to 215, 
75% of the firms fall within 0 to 25, i.e. in the "low" and "medium" 
categories. 
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Two portfolios (detailed in Table 13, Panel A on page 88) were 
created comprising of the "low" and the "medium/high" firms, 
respectively, with 38 firms grouped in the "low" portfolio and 42 firms 
in the "medium/high" portfolio. From Table 13, Panel A, it can be seen 
that the average dividend yield (at 0.009468) for the "low" portfolio is 
disproportionately higher than the average yield for the "medium/high" 
g 
portfolio (0.007460). To control for the separate confounding impact of 
the magnitude of dividend yield, we reexamined the "low" portfolio to 
determine whether any firms had disproportionately high dividend yields 
relative to other firms in that portfolio. The scrutiny resulted in the 
exclusion of 3 firms from the portfolio. The average dividend yield of 
the 3 firms, at 0.03497, was 2.69 standard deviations away from the 
portfolio mean dividend yield. Table 13, Panel B, (also on the following 
page) describes the characteristics of the revised portfolios, comprising 
now of 77 firms of which 35 represent the "low" category of the number of 
institutions holding equity and 42 represent the "medium/high" category. 
From Table 13, Panel B, we note that the average dividend yields for the 
two portfolios are quite similar (0.007683 and 0.007460, respectively). 
Tables 14 and 15 report the average market adjusted abnormal 
returns (AR), the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return 
(CAR), the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days 
after the dividend initiation announcement, for the revised "low" and 
"medium/high" groups, respectively. From Table 14, on page 89,the two- 
day (t=—1,0) announcement period CAR for the "low" portfolio is 3.97% 
with a z-statistic of 5.38, which is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. Most of this two-day CAR accrues on day -1 ( 72%) when 
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Table 13 
A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO 
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING THE FIRM’S EQUITY. 
ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS 
HOLDING EQUITY DOES NOT EXCEED 10 (THE "LOW"CATEGORY). THE OTHER 
PORTFOLIO ("MEDIUM/HIGH") COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDERS EXCEEDS 10. 
PANEL A: PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD. 
Number of Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Institutions Firms Average Std. Deviation 
Holding Equity 
not exceeding 10 38 0.009468 0.009949 
greater than 10 42 0.007460 0.013641 
PANEL B: PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD! 
Number of Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Institutions 
Holding Equity 
Firms Average Std. Deviation 
not exceeding 10 35 0.007683 0.007324 
greater than 10 42 0.007460 0.013646 
* After removal of three firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.69 
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
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Table-14 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR') AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 35 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS 
HOLDING EQUITY UPTO 10 (THE LOW NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING GROUP). 
Panel A: Daily Residuals. 
Date in AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
event time 
-10 0.54 0.54 0.94 
-9 -0.50 0.04 -0.87 
-8 0.66 0.70 1. 15 
-7 -0.21 0. 49 -0.36 
-6 -0.28 0.21 -0. 49 
-5 -0. 12 0.09 -0.21 
-4 0.24 0.33 0.41 
-3 0.39 0.72 0.67 
-2 0.36 1.08 0.62 
-1 2.87 3.95 6.25 
0 1. 10 5.05 1.95 
* Significant at the 
Panel B: Interval 
.01 level of confidence. 
Residuals. 
Period in 
event time 
CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
* 
-1 to 0 3.97 5.38 
+ 1 to +2 0.66 1.23 
+ 1 to +5 2.87 3.28 
+ 1 to + 10 3.07 2.77 
Significant at the . 01 level of confidence. 
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the AR is 2.87% with a t-value of 6.25, which again is statistically 
g 
significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, for all the days -10 through 
-2, the abnormal returns are insignificant. Overall, our analysis of the 
results contained in Table 14, suggests that dividend initiation 
announcements by firms with lesser number of firms participating in the 
equity also appear to be associated with highly significant abnormal 
returns. 
Table 15, presented on the following page, provides a markedly 
different picture with respect to the "medium/high" group. The two-day 
(t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for this portfolio is 0.85% with a z- 
statistic of 2.19, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
All of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1 when the AR is 1.19% with a 
t-value of 3.18 (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). On day 0, 
the AR (at -0.34%) undergoes an insignificant reversal (t-value=-0.85). 
In general, over the interval of days from -10 to -2, the ARs appear to 
be insignificant. However, on day -3, when the AR is at 1.23% with a 
10 
t-value of 3.3 , there appears to be a sizeable leakage of information. 
In general, our analysis of Tables 14 and 15 suggests that the 
association between dividend initiation announcements and abnormal 
returns appears to be much stronger for firms with "low" numbers of 
institutions holding equity than for the "medium/high" group. 
Panel C of Table 26 shows that 74% of the day -1 individual 
abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio, and approximately 
76% are positive for the "medium/high" portfolio. However, the ARs for 
the "low" portfolio are significantly higher than the ARs for the 
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Table-15 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 42 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS 
HOLDING EQUITY RANGING FROM 11 TO 215 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING GROUP). 
Panel A : Daily Residuals. 
Date in 
event time 
AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
-10 0.27 0.27 0.66 
-9 -0.05 0.22 -0. 14 
-8 0.53 0.75 1.32 
-7 0.58 1.33 1.47 
-6 -0.06 1.27 -0. 16 
-5 0.57 1.84 1.44 
-4 -0. 15 1.69 -0.36 
-3 1.23 2.92 3.30* 
-2 -0.24 2.68 -0.60 
-1 1. 19 3.87 3. 18* 
0 -0.34 3.53 -0.85 
* significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
event time 
-1 to 0 0.85 2. 19* 
+1 to +2 0.28 0.78 
+1 to +5 0.68 1. 15 
+1 to +10 1.74 1.43 
* significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
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"medium/high" portfolio. A difference of means test of the ARs of the 
two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded a t-value of 2.79, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the results for this 
proxy are similar to the percentage of institutional holding and the 
market capitalization proxies discussed earlier. 
6.1.2.4 The Estimation Period Market Model R* 2 
For each firm, the market model regression was used to compute 
2 
the R between firm-specific returns and the returns on the CRSP value- 
weighted index over the estimation period t=-90 to t=-31, relative to the 
event period t=-l,0. Firms were classified into low, medium and high 
2 
information environment levels as follows; firms with R less than 0.11 
2 
were classified as "low", those with R between 0.11 and 0.20 were 
2 
classified as "medium", and those with R higher than 0.20 were 
2 
categorized as "high". From Table 2 we see that the estimation period R 
for the sampled firms ranges from 0.00004 to 0.69. Moreover, from Table 
16 (on page 93) we find that over 71% of the sampled firms fall in the 
"low" and "medium" categories. 
Two portfolios (detailed in Table 17, Panel A, on page 94) were 
created comprising of the "low" and the "medium/high" firms, 
respectively, with 40 firms grouped in each of the portfolios. From Table 
17, Panel A, it can be seen that the average dividend yield (at 0.010309) 
for the "low" portfolio is disproportionately higher than the average 
yield for the "medium/high" portfolio (0.006624). Since our objective 
was to have similar average dividend yields for the two portfolios, we 
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Table-16 
A GROUPING OF 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE 
PERIOD 1976-1987 ACCORDING TO THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 
Estimation Period Number of 
Market Model R2 Firms 
upto 0.005 6 
>0.005 to 0.015 7 
0.020 to 0.050 8 
>0.050 to 0.110 20 
>0.110 to 0.200 16 
>0.200 to 0.300 15 
>0.300 to 0.400 6 
>0.500 to 0.700 2 
Total 80 
reexamined the "low" portfolio to determine whether any firms had 
disproportionately high dividend yields relative to other firms in that 
portfolio. The scrutiny resulted in the exclusion of 4 firms from the 
portfolio. The mean dividend yield of these firms at 0.051576 was 2.653 
standard deviations away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
Table 17, Panel B, describes the characteristics of the revised 
portfolios, comprising now of 76 firms of which 36 represent the "low" 
category of the number of institutions holding equity and 40 
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Table 17 
A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO 
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON EACH FIRM’S 60 DAY ESTIMATION PERIOD R2 OF THE MARKET 
MODEL. ONE PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE ESTIMATION PERIOD 
R2 IS LESS THAN 0.11. THE OTHER PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH 
THE ESTIMATION PERIOD R2 EQUALS OR EXCEEDS 0.11. 
PANEL A: PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD. 
Estimation Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
T-. • 1 , t i . 7 PT7 7 77 7 I 7 Period R~ Category Firms Average Std. Deviation 
less than 0.11 40 0.010309 0.015556 
greater than or equal to 40 0.006624 0.007872 
0. 11 
PANEL B: PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD. 
Estimation 
-2- 
Period R Category 
Number of 
Firms 
Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Average Std. Deviation 
less than 0.11 36 0.006315 0.007549 
greater than or equal to 40 0.006624 0.007874 
0. 11 
* After removal of four firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.65 
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
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represent the "medium/high" category. From Table 17, Panel B, we note 
that the average dividend yields for the two portfolios are quite similar 
(0.006315 and 0.006624, respectively). 
Tables 18 and 19 report the average market adjusted abnormal 
returns (AR), the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return 
(CAR), the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days 
after the dividend initiation announcement, for the revised "low" and 
"medium/high" groups, respectively. From Table 18, (presented on the 
following page) the two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for the 
"low" portfolio is 2.67% with a z-statistic of 3.94, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Most of this two-day CAR 
accrues on day -1 ( over 85%) when the AR is 2.29% with a t-value of 
11 
5.11, which again is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Moreover, for all the days -10 through -2, the abnormal returns are 
insignificant. Overall, our analysis of the results contained in Table 
2 
18, suggests that dividend initiation announcements by low R firms 
appear to be associated with highly significant abnormal returns. 
However, the results are not as strongly significant as for the three 
proxies discussed earlier. 
Table 19, on page 97, presents the results for the "medium/high" 
group. The two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for this portfolio 
is 1.95% with a z-statistic of 3.46, which is statistically significant 
at the 0.05 level. Much of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1 (over 85%) 
when the AR is 1.67% with a t-value of 3.62 (statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level). Similar to the results reported for the "medium/high" 
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Table-18 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 36 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH ESTIMATION PERIOD 
MARKET-MODEL R2 LESS THAN 0.11. 
Panel A: Daily Residuals 
Date in AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
event time 
-10 -0.08 i o
 
o
 
0
0
 
i o
 
►->
 
0
1
 
-9 0. 48 0.40 0.91 
-8 0. 11 0.51 0.21 
-7 -0. 12 0.39 -0.22 
-6 -0.62 -0.23 -1. 18 
-5 0. 15 -0.08 0.28 
-4 -0.31 -0.39 -0.59 
-3 0.50 0. 11 0.94 
-2 -0.49 -0.38 -0.92 
-1 2.29 1.91 5. 11 
0 
* Significant at the 
0.38 2.29 
.01 level of confidence. 
0.72 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in 
event time 
CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
-1 to 0 2.67 3.94* 
+ 1 to +2 0.65 0.87 
+ 1 to +5 2.28 2.35 
+ 1 to + 10 1.95 1.63 
* Significant at the .01 level of confidence. 
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Table-19 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 40 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE ESTIMATION PERIOD 
MARKET-MODEL R2 EQUAL TO OR EXCEEDING 0.11. 
Panel A: Daily Residuals. 
Date in 
event time 
AR (%) CAR (%.) (t-statistic) 
-10 0.88 0.88 1.79 
-9 -0.90 -0.02 -1.85 
-8 0.88 0.86 1.79 
-7 0.69 1.55 1.39 
-6 0.41 1.96 0.81 
-5 0.52 2.48 1.04 
-4 0.41 2.89 0.81 
* 
-3 1.20 4.09 2.47 
-2 0. 45 4.54 0.90 
* 
-1 1.67 6.21 3.62 
0 0.28 6. 49 0.55 
* significant at the .05 level. 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in CAR(%) (z-statistic) 
event time 
* 
-1 to 0 1.95 3.46 
+1 to +2 0.26 1.09 
+1 to +5 1.20 1.97 
+1 to +10 2.85 2.53 
* Significant at the .05 level. 
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portfolios for the proxies discussed earlier, there appears to be a 
sizeable leakage of information on day -3 when the AR is at 1.20% with a 
12 
t-value of 2.47. Otherwise, the ARs for the days -10 through -2 are, in 
general, insignificant. 
Panel D of Table 26 shows that 78% of the day -1 individual 
abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio, and 75% are 
positive for the "medium/high" portfolio. A difference of means test of 
the ARs of the two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded an insignificant 
t-value of 1.01. 
The findings suggest that the association between dividend 
initiation announcements and abnormal returns is not very different 
2 2 
between the "low" R firms and the "medium/high" R firms. Our results, 
2 
therefore, appear to indicate that the estimation period market model R 
may not be a powerful, explanatory proxy for the firm’s information 
environment. 
6.1.2.5 The Number of Analysts Following 
For each firm, the Number of Analysts Following was obtained for 
the month immediately preceding the month of the dividend initiation 
13 
announcement, from the IBES tapes. However, from the original sample of 
80 firms, data was not available for 17 firms on the IBES tapes. Hence, 
a two stage procedure was followed in the classification of firms into 
low, medium and high information environment levels. In the first stage, 
we assumed that the 17 firms, for which data was not available on the 
IBES tapes, had no analyst following. In the second stage, we excluded 
the 17 firms on the premise that there was insufficient information about 
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Table-20 
A PROFILE OF THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING IN 80 EXCHANGE-LISTED 
DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS DURING THE PERIOD 1976-1987 IN THE MONTH PRIOR 
TO THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT. 
No of Analysts 
Following 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
10 
14 
16 
Total 
* Includes 17 firms not listed by 
following. 
Number of 
Firms 
33 
18 
9 
2 
8 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
80 
IBES and assumed to have no analyst 
the extent of analyst following for these firms. For both sets of 
analyses, firms were classified into low, medium and high information 
environment levels as follows; firms with 0 and 1 analyst following were 
designated as "low", those with the number of analysts following between 
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2 and 6 were classified as "medium", and those with analyst following in 
excess of 6 were categorized as "high". From Table 2, on page 56, we see 
that the Number of Analysts Following for both the sets of sampled firms 
ranges from 0 to 16. Moreover, from Table 20, (presented on page 99) we 
find that over 93% of the sampled firms fall in the "low" and "medium" 
categories, for our first stage analysis. 92% fall into these categories 
for the second stage analysis. 
In the first stage, two portfolios (detailed in Table 21, Panel 
A, on the following page) were created comprising of the "low" and the 
"medium/high" firms, respectively, with 51 firms grouped in the "low" 
portfolio and 29 firms in the "medium/high" portfolio. From Table 21, 
Panel A, we note that, as in the case of the proxy variables discussed in 
the earlier sub-sections, the average dividend yield (at 0.010407) for 
the "low" portfolio is disproportionately higher than the average yield 
for the "medium/high" portfolio (0.005018). A reexamination of the "low" 
portfolio with the objective of excluding any firms which might have had 
disproportionately high dividend yields relative to other firms in that 
portfolio resulted in the exclusion of 6 firms. The mean dividend yield 
of these firms at 0.040436 was 2.20 standard deviations away from the 
average portfolio dividend yield. Table 21, Panel B, describes the 
characteristics of the revised portfolios, comprising now of 74 firms of 
which 45 represent the "low" category of the number of analysts following 
and 29 represent the "medium/high" category. We see, from the table, 
that now the average dividend yields for the two portfolios are quite 
similar (0.005787 and 0.005018, respectively). 
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Table 21 
A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO 
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE FIRMS. ONE 
PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING 
DOES NOT EXCEED 1 (THE "LOW"CATEGORY). THE OTHER PORTFOLIO 
("MEDIUM/HIGH") COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS 
FOLLOWING EXCEEDS 1. 
Panel A: Portfolio Grouping Before Controlling for Dividend Yield. 
Number of Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Analysts Firms Average Std. Deviation 
Following 
not exceeding 1 51 0.010407 0.013641 
greater than 1 29 0.005018 0.008426 
Includes 17 firms not listed by IBES and assumed to have no analyst 
following. 
** 
Panel B: Portfolio Grouping After Controlling for Dividend Yield. 
Number of Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Analysts 
Following 
Firms Average Std. Deviation 
* 
not exceeding 1 45 0.005787 0.004472 
greater than 1 29 0.005018 0.008426 
* Includes 14 firms not listed by IBES and assumed to have no analyst 
follow!ng. 
** After removal of six firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.20 
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
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Tables 22 and 23 report the average market adjusted abnormal 
returns (AR), the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal return 
(CAR), the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 10 days 
after the dividend initiation announcement, for the revised "low" and 
"medium/high" groups, respectively. From Table 22, on page 103, the 
two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for the "low" portfolio is 2.77% 
with a z-statistic of 4.37, which is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level. Over 83% of this two-day CAR is concentrated on day -1 when 
the AR is 2.30% with a t-value of 5.72, which again is statistically 
14 
significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests, once again, that much of 
the announcement effect is captured on day -1 when the news is released 
over the Broad Tape. Apart from a possible significant leakage of 
information on day -3, for all of the days -10 through -2, the abnormal 
returns are insignificant. Overall, our analysis of the results 
contained in Table 22, suggests that dividend initiation announcements by 
firms with low analyst following appear to be associated with highly 
significant abnormal returns. However, the results are not as strongly 
significant as for the percentage of institutional equity holding, market 
capitalization and number of institutions holding proxies discussed 
earlier. 
Table 23, on page 104, presents the results for the 
"medium/high" group. The two-day (t=-l,0) announcement period CAR for 
this portfolio is 1.49% with a z-statistic of 2.87, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Since the AR on day 0 is 
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Table-22 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURNS (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 45 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST 
FOLLOWING NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP). 
17 OF THESE SAMPLED FIRMS ARE NOT LISTED BY IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE 
NO ANALYST FOLLOWING. 
Panel A: Daily Residuals. 
Date in AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
event time 
-10 0.39 0.39 0.80 
-9 0.05 0.44 0. 10 
-8 0. 37 0.81 0.75 
-7 0.25 1.06 0.52 
-6 -0.54 0.52 -1. 12 
-5 0.34 0.86 0.68 
-4 0.38 1.24 0.77 
-3 1.02 2.26 2. 13 
-2 0.03 2.29 0.06 
-1 2.30 4.59 5.72 
0 
* Significant at the 
0.47 5.06 
.01 level of confidence. 
0.95 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
event time 
-1 to 0 2.77 
+ 1 to +2 0.20 
+ 1 to +5 1.71 
+ 1 to + 10 2.42 
* Significant at the .01 level of confidence. 
4.37 
0.54 
2.43 
2.35 
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Table-23 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 29 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS 
FOLLOWING RANGING FROM 2 TO 16 (THE MEDIUM/HIGH NUMBER OF ANALYSTS 
FOLLOWING GROUP). 
Panel A : Daily Residuals. 
Date in 
event time 
AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
-10 0.27 0.27 0.61 
-9 -0.77 0.50 -1.77 
-8 0.84 0.34 1.91 
-7 0.04 0.38 0. 10 
-6 0.46 0.84 1.02 
-5 0.02 0.86 0.05 
-4 -0.84 0.02 -1.93 
-3 0.60 0.62 1.35 
-2 -0. 15 0.47 -0.33 
-1 1.53 2.00 
* 
3.74 
0 
* significant at the 
-0.04 
.05 level of confidence. 
1.96 -0.09 
Panel B: Interval Residuals. 
Period in 
event time 
CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
-1 to 0 1.49 2.87* 
+1 to +2 0.68 1.43 
+1 to +5 1.77 2. 18 
+1 to +10 2.61 2.06 
* significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
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-0.04%, all of this two-day CAR occurs on day -1 when the AR is 1.53% 
with a t-value of 3.74 (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). 
Moreover, apart from sizeable negative ARs of -0.77% and -0.84% on days 
-9 and -4, generally the ARs appear to be insignificant from days -10 to 
-2. 
Panel E of Table 26 (page 109) reports that, for both the "low" 
and the "medium/high" portfolios, 76% of the day -1 individual abnormal 
returns are positive. However, a difference of means test of the ARs of 
the two groups on day t=-l yields an insignificant t-statistic of 1.37. 
The second stage of our analysis was based on the premise that 
for the 17 firms not listed in the IBES tapes there was insufficient 
information available about the extent of analyst following. Hence, 
these 17 "firm-events" were excluded from the "low" analyst following 
portfolio. A separate analysis was conducted with the remaining 63 
"firm-events", of which 34 belonged to the "low" information environment 
15 
group and 29 belonged to the "medium/high" group. From Table 24, Panel 
A, presented on the following page, it can be seen that the average 
dividend yield (at 0.009838) for the "low" portfolio is 
disproportionately higher than the average yield for the "medium/high" 
portfolio (0.005018). A subsequent scrutiny of the "low" portfolio 
revealed that 4 firms had a mean dividend yield of 0.046720 which was 
2.66 standard deviations away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
We, therefore, excluded the 4 firms with disproportionately high dividend 
yields from the portfolio. Table 24, Panel B, describes the 
characteristics of the revised portfolios, comprising now of 59 firms of 
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Table 24 
A GROUPING OF EXCHANGE-LISTED, DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS INTO TWO 
PORTFOLIOS BASED ON THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING THE FIRMS. ONE 
PORTFOLIO COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING 
DOES NOT EXCEED 1 (THE "LOW"CATEGORY). THE OTHER PORTFOLIO 
("MEDIUM/HIGH") COMPRISES OF FIRMS FOR WHICH THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS 
FOLLOWING EXCEEDS 1. 
PANEL A: PORTFOLIO GROUPING BEFORE CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD 
Number of Number of Dividend Yield (per Quarter) 
Analysts 
Following 
Firms Average Std. Deviation 
* 
not exceeding 1 34 0.009838 0.013890 
greater than 1 29 0.005018 0.008426 
PANEL B: PORTFOLIO GROUPING AFTER CONTROLLING FOR DIVIDEND YIELD^* ** 
Number of Number of Dividend Yield (per Quart 
Analysts Firms Average Std. Deviation 
Following 
* 
not exceeding 1 30 0.005886 0.003606 
greater than 1 29 0.005018 0.008426 
* Excludes 17 firms not listed by IBES on the premise that there is 
insufficient information about the extent of analyst following on these 
firms. 
** After removal of four firms with a mean dividend yield of more than 2.66 
standard devistions away from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
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which 30 represent the "low" category of the number of analysts following 
and 29 represent the "medium/high" category. We note that the average 
dividend yields for the two portfolios are now quite similar (0.005886 
and 0.005018, respectively). 
Table 25, on next page, reports the average market adjusted 
abnormal returns (AR), the cumulative sum of the daily average abnormal 
return (CAR), the t-statistic and the z-statistic from 10 days before to 
10 days after the dividend initiation announcement, for the revised "low" 
group, in the second stage of analysis. From Table 25, the two-day (t=- 
1,0) announcement period CAR for the "low" portfolio is 3.77% with a 
z-statistic of 4.85, which is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. Day -1 accounts for over 85% of the two-day CAR with an AR of 
3.21% and a t-value of 6.72, which again is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. For the interval of days -10 through -2, the abnormal 
returns are insignificant. Overall, our analysis of the results 
contained in Table 25, suggests that dividend initiation announcements by 
firms with low analyst following appear to be associated with highly 
significant abnormal returns. Moreover, these results appear to be 
sizeably stronger than the results for the "low" information environment 
group in the first stage analysis. 
The results for the "medium/high" group (detailed in Table 23 
above) have already been discussed above. 
Panel E of Table 26 (page 109) shows that 83% of the day -1 
individual abnormal returns are positive for the "low" portfolio. For the 
"medium/high" portfolio the figure is 76%. A difference of means test of 
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Table-25 
DAILY AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), CUMULATIVE SUM OF 
THE DAILY AVERAGE ABNORMAL RETURN (CAR’) AND MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL 
RETURN (CAR) FROM 10 DAYS BEFORE TO 10 DAYS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION 
ANNOUNCEMENT BY 30 EXCHANGE-LISTED FIRMS WITH THE NUMBER OF ANALYST 
FOLLOWING NOT EXCEEDING 1 (THE LOW NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING GROUP). 
THIS SAMPLEEXCLUDES 17 FIRMS NOT LISTED ON IBES ON THE PREMISE THAT THERE 
IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ABOUT THE EXTENT OF ANALYST FOLLOWING IN THESE 
FIRMS. 
Panel A: Daily Residuals. 
Date in 
event time 
AR (%) CAR (%) (t-statistic) 
-10 0. 52 0.52 0.84 
-9 
to 
o
 
6
 i 0. 46 -0. 10 
-8 -0.30 0. 16 i o
 
CO
 
-7 0. 23 0.39 0.36 
-6 -0. 42 -0.03 -0.68 
-5 0.66 0.63 1.06 
-4 0.52 1. 15 0.83 
-3 0.29 1.44 0.46 
-2 0. 13 1.57 0.21 
-1 3.21 4.78 
* 
6.72 
0 0.56 5.34 0.89 
Period in 
event time 
CAR (%) (z-statistic) 
-1 to 0 3.77 
* 
4.85 
+1 to +2 -0.25 -0.39 
+1 to +5 1.73 1.97 
+1 to +10 2.01 1.60 
* Significant at the .01 level of confidence. 
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Table-26 
AVERAGE MARKET-ADJUSTED ABNORMAL RETURNS (AR), T-STATISTIC AND THE 
PERCENTAGE OF AR POSITIVE ON DAY -1 RELATIVE TO THE WSJI DIVIDEND 
INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT DATE (DAY 0) FOR LOW AND MEDIUM/HIGH INFORMATION 
ENVIRONMENT FIRMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PERCENTAGE OF INSTITUTIONAL 
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT. CAP), NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY (NINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 
(R2) AND NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) PROXIES. THE T-VALUES 
WITHIN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TESTS BETWEEN THE LOW 
AND MEDIUM/HIGH PORTFOLIOS FOR THE RESPECTIVE PROXIES. 
Information 
environment N AR (%) t-statistic % Positive 
proxy 
Panel A: % Inst. Holding 
Low 42 2.56 6.56* 76 
Medium/high 33 1.07 
* * 
2.30 76 
(Diff of Means) ( 2.54**) 
Panel B: Market Cap 
Low 39 2.80 7.01* 77 
Medium/High 36 0.89 
* * 
2.09 69 
(Diff. of Means) ( 3.29*) 
Panel C: No. Inst. Holding 
Low 35 2.87 6.25* 74 
Medium/High 42 1. 19 3. 18* 76 
(Diff. of Means) ( 2.79*) 
PaneID: R2 
Low 36 2.29 5. 11* 78 
Medium/High 40 1.67 3.62* 75 
(Diff. of Means) ( 1.01 ) 
Panel E: No. Anlst. Following 
Low (all firms) 45 2.30 5.72* 76 
Low (only firms 30 3.21 6.72* 83 
listed in IBES) * 
Medium/High 29 1.53 3.74 76 
(Diff of Means) ( 1.37 ) 
( 2.54**) 
a. N represents the number of firms within each portfolio. 
* Significant at the 0.01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
109 
the ARs of the two portfolios as on day t=-l yielded a t-value of 2.54, 
which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
When we consider only IBES listed firms in our second stage 
analysis, the association between dividend initiation announcements and 
abnormal returns appears to be much stronger for the "low" analyst 
following firms than for the "medium/high" firms. These results are 
consistent with our findings for the first three proxies discussed 
earlier. The results for the "low" analyst following firms from our 
first stage analysis are considerably less strong. Hence, our 
preliminary conclusions for the Number of Analysts Following proxy are 
somewhat mixed. Our second stage analysis with the sample of 63 "firm- 
events" does appear to indicate that this is a powerful, explanatory 
proxy for the firm’s information environment. However, had data been 
available for all of the 80 "firm-events" in our sample, this conclusion 
might have been further reinforced. 
6.2 Analysis of Volatility 
Table 27 (see the following page) compares the estimation period 
and event period average daily return variances for the five proxy 
measures analyzed in Section 6.1. We note that for the market 
capitalization (MKT.CAP), percentage of institutional equity holding 
(INST), and the number of institutions holding equity (NINST) proxies, in 
the "low" information environment category, the ratios of average event 
period (t=-3,0) variances to average estimation period (t=-90,-31) 
variances are approximately 1.63, 1.53 and 1.81 respectively. However, 
for the "medium/high" information environment firms, average event 
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Table 27 
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD (T=-3,0) 
AVERAGE DAILY RETURN VARIANCES ACROSS INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO 
GROUPINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE MARKET CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY, THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 AND 
THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING PROXIES. 
2 
<r 
eve 
Information 
Environment Na 
Avg. Estimation 
period daily cr 
Avg. Event 
period daily <r 
2 
<r 
est 
Panel A: % Inst. Holding 
Low 42 0.000986 0.001505 1.52643 
Medium/High 33 0.000899 
« 
0.000902 1.00407 
Panel B: Market Cap 
Low 39 0.000964 0.001569 1.62776 
Medium/High 36 0.000765 0.000707 0.92430 
Panel C: No. Inst. Holding 
Low 35 0.000911 0.001648 1.80890 
Medium/High 42 0.001081 0.000874 0.80851 
Panel D: R2 
Low 36 0.000848 0.001269 1.49590 
Medium/High 40 0.001059 0.001179 1.11330 
Panel E: No. Anlst Following 
Low (all firms) 45 0.001202 0.001369 1.13864 
Low (only firms 
listed in IBES) 
30 0.001105 0.001596 1.44448 
Medium/High 29 0.000753 0.001024 1.35989 
a.N represents the number of firms for which the average variance has 
been estimated. 
* Since the variable ANLST has a large number of values equal to zero, we 
have added a value of 0.01 to it before computing its logarithmic value. 
Ill 
period variances are actually lower than average estimation period 
variances for the MKT. CAP and NINST proxies (cr2 /cr2 is 0.92430 and 
eve est 
0.80851 respectively) and approximately the same for the INST proxy 
2 2 
(<r /(r = 1.00407). While the increase in event period volatilities 
eve est 
for "low" information environment firms suggests heightened uncertainty 
around dividend initiation announcements, the results for the 
"medium/high" information environment firms suggest a lesser degree and 
an earlier resolution of uncertainty surrounding dividend initiations. 
These latter findings differ from the conclusions of Kalay and Lowenstein 
[1985] who report substantial increases in security returns volatility 
16 2 
around dividend announcements. For the ANLST and R proxies, average 
event period variances are higher than estimation period variances in 
both the "low" and the "medium/high" portfolios. For the second stage 
analysis of the ANLST proxy involving 59 firms listed by IBES, the ratio 
of variances is higher for the "low" information environment portfolio 
(1.4445 relative to 1.3598). For the first stage analysis of the ANLST 
17 
proxy , however, the ratio of variances is higher for the "medium/high" 
portfolio 1.3598 relative to 1.1386). For the R2 proxy, the ratio of 
variances is higher for the "low" information environment portfolio 
(1.4959 relative to 1.1133). 
These findings are, in general, further substantiated in Table 
28 (on pages 113 and 114) which reports the analysis of variance ratios 
for individual firms in each information environment portfolio. For 
instance, Panel B of the Table reports findings for the MKT. CAP proxy. 
We note that for 51% of the "low" market capitalization firms, the 
variance ratio is greater than 2, while for 28% of the firms, the ratio 
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Table 28 
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION PERIOD (T=-31,-90) AND EVENT PERIOD (T=-3,0) 
DAILY RETURN VARIANCES FOR INDIVIDUAL FIRM-EVENTS ACROSS INFORMATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT PORTFOLIO GROUPINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION, % AND NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING EQUITY, THE 
ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2 AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING 
PROXIES. THE NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES REPRESENT PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL 
NUMBER OF FIRM-EVENTS IN 
Information 
THE RESPECTIVE PORTFOLIOS. 
Ratio of Event period to Estimation period 
Environment N Number (and %) of firms in the categories of 
( 0 to < 1) ( > 1 but < 2) ( > 2) 
Panel A: °/ Inst. Holding 
Low 42 13 13 16 
(100) (31) (31) (38) 
Medium/High 33 14 7 12 
(100) (43) (21) (36) 
Panel B: Market — 
Cap 
Low 39 11 8 20 
(100) (28) (21) (51) 
Medium/High 36 19 11 6 
(100) (53) (31) (16) 
Panel C: No. Inst. Holding 
Low 35 8 9 18 
(100) (23) (26) (51) 
Medium/High 42 24 8 10 
(100) (57) (19) (24) 
a. N represents the number of firms for which the average variance has 
been estimated. 
continued on next page 
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Table 28 (continued) 
Information Ratio of Event period to Estimation period cr 
Environment Na Number (and %) of firms in the categories of 
( 0 to < 1) ( > 1 but < 2) ( > 2) 
Panel D: R2 
Low 36 12 11 13 
(100) (34) (30) (36) 
Medium/High 40 15 11 14 
(100) (37) (28) (35) 
Panel E: No. Anlst Following 
Low (all firms) 45 19 13 14 
(100) (41) (28) (31) 
Low (only firms 30 11 8 11 
(100) (36) (18) (36) 
listed in IBES) 
Medium/High 29 11 9 9 
(100) (38) (31) (31) 
a. N represents the number of firms for which the . average variance has 
been estimated. 
is less than 1. However, for the "medium/high" group, only 16% of the 
individual firms have variance ratios greater than 2, whereas 53% of the 
firms have variances ratios less than 1. Similar results are reported 
for the NINST proxy. The results for the INST, R2 and ANLST proxies are 
less powerful. Hence, except for the INST proxy, for which the results 
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reported in Table 27 are really quite powerful and are not substantiated 
by the findings reported in Table 28, in general the two sets of findings 
tend to corroborate one another. 
6.3 Regression Analysis 
6.3.1 Analysis with Actual Values of Event Period SCAR 
Separate regressions were run, in six different stages, using the 
dividend initiation observations, with the two day (t=—1,0) SCAR as the 
dependant variable. The first two stages of analyses used the entire 
18 
sample of 80 dividend initiation observations. In the first stage, six 
univariate regressions were run with the natural logs of Percentage of 
Institutional Equity Holding (LINST), Market Capitalization (LMKT. CAP), 
Number of Institutions Holding Firm Equity (LNINST), 0.01 + Number of 
10 2 
Analysts Following (LANLST), Estimation Period Market Model R (LC0RR), 
and Dividend Yield (LUDIV) as independant variables. The results, 
presented in Table 29, on page 116, indicate that all the coefficients 
have their expected signs - i.e. the coefficients for the natural logs of 
the information environment proxy variables have negative signs whereas 
the coefficient for the natural log of Dividend Yield has a positive 
sign. Moreover, while the t-values relative to the coefficients for 
LINST, LMKT. CAP, LNINST, LANLST and LUDIV are statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level, the t-value relative to LC0RR is not statistically 
significant. We also note that the coefficient for LMKT. CAP has the 
highest significant t-statistic followed by the coefficients for LINST, 
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Table 29 
RESULTS OF FIVE SEPARATE REGRESSIONS WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, 
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), NUMBER OF ANALYSTS 
FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES. 
THE VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERMS OF THE FIVE 
RESPECTIVE REGRESSIONS. THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 80 DIVIDEND INITIATING 
FIRMS, OF WHICH 17 ARE NOT LISTED BY IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE NO 
ANALYST FOLLOWING. 
Independant 
Variables 
LINST 
LMKT. CAP 
LNINST 
LCORR 
LANLST* 
LUDIV 
Coefficient 
-0.72080 
(0.53502) 
-1.4955 
(9.2615) 
-0.7638 
(4.3851) 
-0.0746 
(2.3819) 
-0.3286 
(2.0719) 
0.4774 
(4.9374) 
t-statistic 
-2.5994a 
(0.5784) 
-3.7088a 
(4.9646a) 
-1.9743a 
(4.1866a) 
-0.2633 
(2.7115a) 
-1.8243a 
(3.6202a) 
1.7639a 
(3.4435a) 
F-statistic 
6.757 
13.755 
3.898 
0.069 
3.328 
3. Ill 
Adjusted R2 
0.0679 
0.1390 
0.0354 
-0.0119 
0.0286 
0.0260 
a. Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
* Since the variable ANLST has a large number of values equal to zero, we 
have added a value of 0.01 to it before computing its logarithmic value. 
2 
LNINST, LANLST and LUDIV. The F-statistic and the Adjusted R for the 
independant variables follow a similar order of magnitude. 
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Table-30 
RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, 
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT 
VARIABLES. THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE 
COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 80 DIVIDEND 
INITIATING FIRMS, OF WHICH 17 ARE NOT LISTED BY IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO 
HAVE NO ANALYST FOLLOWING. 
SCAR = /3 + /3 LI! 
i o l 
Coefficient 
Estimates 7.6054 -0. 
(2.5886) (-1. 
+ £ LCorr + 
4 i 
Coefficient 0.0326 
Estimates (0.1263) 
F-Statistic: 2.764 
Adjusted R2: 0.118 
a.Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
NST + 13 LMKT. CAP + (3 LNINST 
12 13 i 
4748 -1.5066 
5483) (-2.5698 ) 
0.5289 
(0.9562) 
13 LANLST + /3 LUDiv + e 
5 16 i i 
-0.0128 0.1662 
(-0.0591) (0.5731) 
* Since the variable ANLST has a large number of values equal to zero, we 
have added a value of 0.01 to it before computing its logarithmic value. 
The second stage involved running a multivariate regression with 
the two-day (t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST, LMKT. CAP, 
LNINST, LANLST, LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables. The results, 
given in Table 30 above, indicate that the t-value relative to the 
coefficient for LMKT CAP is still statistically significant at the 0.10 
level. However, none of the other coefficients are statistically 
p o 
significant at the 0.10 level. Moreover, while the coefficients for 
LMKT. CAP, LINST, LANLST and LUDIV maintain their expected signs, the 
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Table 31 
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN 
CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOG 
OF NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLE. THE 
VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE REGRESSION. THE 
SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 63 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS, ALL OF WHICH ARE LISTED 
BY IBES. 
Independant 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic F-statistic Adjusted R‘ 
LANLST* -0.5716 
(2.3171) 
-2.5102a 
(3.8209a) 
6.301 0.0788 
a. Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
coefficients for LNINST and LCORR show positive signs. The reason for 
the unexpected positive sign on LNINST is possibly because of a high 
level of col1inearity, particularly with the LMKT. CAP, LINST and LANLST 
21 
variables. The regression has an F-statistic of 2.764 which with (7,73) 
degrees of freedom is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. 
The third and fourth stages of analyses used a sample of 63 
22 
dividend initiation observations. The purpose of this part of the study 
was to reexamine the results for the LANLST variable using only firm- 
event observations for which the Number of Analysts Following was 
definitely known. Hence, in the third stage, a single univariate 
regressions was run, with LANLST as the independant variable. The 
results, presented in Table 31 above indicate that the coefficient (at 
-0.5716) has the expected negative sign with a t-value of -2.5102 which 
is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The regression has an 
118 
F-statistic of 6.301 and an adjusted R2of 0.0788. A comparison of Table 
31 with Table 29 also shows considerably stronger results for the LANLST 
variable with 63 IBES listed firm-event observations for which 
information regarding the Number of Analysts Following is available than 
for the full sample of 80 observations. 
The fourth stage involved running a multivariate regression, for 
the 63 firm-events, with the two-day (t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant 
variable and LINST, LMKT. CAP, LNINST, LANLST, LCORR and LUDIV as 
independant variables. The results, given in Table 32 (on page 120), 
indicate that the t-value relative to the coefficient for LMKT CAP, while 
less than the t-value reported in Table 30, is still statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. However, none of the other coefficients 
23 
are statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Moreover, similar to 
the results of Table 30, while the coefficients for LMKT. CAP, LINST, 
LANLST and LUDIV maintain their expected signs, the coefficients for 
LNINST and LCORR show positive signs. Once again, the reason for the 
unexpected positive sign on LNINST is possibly because of a high level of 
col1inearity, particularly with the LMKT. CAP, LINST, and LANLST 
variables. The regression has an F-statistic of 2.411, which, with 
(7,56) degrees of freedom, is statistically significant at the 0.10 
level. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.120. A comparison of the 
results of Table 32, with those contained in Table 30, reveals a stronger 
coefficient and t-statistic for the LANLST variable but weaker values for 
the LMKT. CAP and NINST variables for the 63 firm-events for which the 
Number of Analysts Following is definitely known. 
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Table 32 
RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, 
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT 
VARIABLES. THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE 
COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 63 DIVIDEND 
INITIATING FIRMS, ALL OF WHICH ARE LISTED BY IBES. 
SCAR = (3 + (3 LINST + 
i 0 1 i 
/3 LMKT. CAP + /3 LNINST 
2 13 i 
Coefficient 
Estimates 6.6609 -0.6297 -1.2984 
(1.8537)(-1.5204) (-1.7616*) 
0.7899 
(1.0302) 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
+ £ LCorr + 
4 i 
0.0506 
(0.1589) 
13 LANLST*+ 
5 i 
-0.1087 
(-0.3213) 
of confidence. 
^ LUDiv + e 
6 i i 
0.3627 
(0.9417) 
F-Statistic: 2.411 
Adjusted R2: 0. 120 
a.Significant at the 0.10 level 
* Since the variable ANLST has a large number of values equal to zero, we 
have added a value of 0.01 to it before computing its logarithmic 
value. 
Finally, the fifth and sixth stages of analyses used a sample of 
24 
26 dividend initiation observations. The purpose, here, was to examine 
the Dispersion of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts Variable as a proxy for 
the firm’s information environment. Hence, in the fifth stage, a single 
univariate regression was run, with the natural log of the Dispersion of 
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Table 33 
RESULTS ZF TEE SECESSION •THE THE TJC DAY (T*-1.0> STANDARD .TO Ml'AN 
t -e zt he zzeendmh variable, and tr: \ \ 
OF Z:SEEESI3v ZF ANALYSTS' EARNINGS ETRECASTS <LITSP> AS lNDEPENDANT 
VARIABLE THE .TIES IS PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT VERM OK 1'UK 
REGEESSIOfc THE SM«£ COrSUSES OF 2S DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS, All OK 
WHICH ARE LZSTEE EE ZEES AS HAVING NDRE THAN ONE ANALYST FOLLOWING, 
Independs.-* 
Varisc les Coefficient t-statistic F-stat1stic Adjusted H" 
LDISP 0- 9585 1.1302 1.277 0.0110 
[4.6278) (1.6914*) 
a. Siy.:f:^am a* ~Jx Z.1Z Ist?; of confidence. 
Analysts’ Earn inns Forecasts (LDISP) as the independant variable. The 
results, presented in Cable 33 above indicate that the coefficient has 
the expected positive sign with a statistically significant t-value at 
the 0.10 level. The regression has an F-statistic of 1.277 and an 
adjustec R* of 0.0110, which are less strong than in the earlier 
regressions. 
The sixth stage involved running a multivariate regression with 
the two-day (t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST, LMKT. CAP, 
LNINST, LAKLST25, LDISP, LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables, for the 
26 firm-events. The results, given in Table 34, indicate that, apart 
from the coefficient for LUDIV which is statistically significant at the 
0.10 level, none of the other coefficients are statistically significant. 
The coefficients for LMKT. CAP, LDISP, LUDIV and LCORR maintain their 
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Table 34 
RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, 
AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY HOLDING (LINST), MARKET 
CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY 
(LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF 
ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST), THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS 
FORECASTS (LDISP) AND DIVIDEND YIELD (LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES. 
THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE COEFFICIENT 
VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE COMPRISES OF 26 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS, 
ALL OF WHICH ARE LISTED BY IBES AS HAVING MORE THAN ONE ANALYST 
FOLLOWING. 
SCAR = 0 + /3 LINST + 
i O 1 i 
Coefficient 
Estimates 18.431 0.7278 
(1.9047a) (0.6358) 
|3 LMKT. CAP + 
2 i 
-0.6299 
(-0.6060) 
f3 LNINST 
3 i 
0.3663 
(0.1529) 
+ 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
13 LCorr + 
4 i 
-0.4308 
(-0.5091) 
(3 LANLST + 
s i 
0.8859 
(0.5463) 
13 LDISP + 
6 i 
1.3574 
(1.3676) 
13 LUDiv + e 
7 i i 
1.8387 
(1.7527a) 
F-Statistic: 1.012 
Adjusted R2: 0.0032 
a. Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
expected signs. The coefficients for LINST, LNINST and LANLST show 
positive signs. While interpretation of the results in Tables 33 and 34 
is certainly limited by the small sample of 26 observations, we do get an 
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indication that the Dispersion of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts might be a 
reasonably good proxy for the firm’s information environment. 
Overall, from the regression results, it appears that Market 
Capitalization, followed closely by the Percentage of Institutional 
Equity Holding, is perhaps the most powerful explanatory proxy variable 
for the information environment amongst those being examined in this 
study. The Number of Analysts Following also appears to be a powerful 
proxy. However, our conclusions with regard to this variable have been 
somewhat weakened by the non-availability of "analyst following" data for 
17 firm-events. The Number of Institutions Holding Firm Equity, while a 
good proxy, appears to be less powerful. Consistent with the findings of 
section 6.1.2.4, the regressions appear to indicate that the estimation 
2 
period market model R may not be a good proxy for the firm’s information 
environment. Finally, our examination of the Dispersion of Analysts’ 
Earnings Forecasts as a proxy variable has been constrained by the modest 
sample of 26 observations. This variable appears to be a reasonably 
powerful proxy and merits later investigation with larger samples. 
6.3.2 Analysis with Absolute Values of Event Period SCAR 
So far, our results from the regressions indicate that Market 
Capitalization, and, to a lesser extent, the Percentage of Institutional 
Equity Holding, appear to best explain the information environment, 
amongst the proxy variables being examined in the study. To investigate 
the robustness and consistency of these findings, we conducted tests on 
two separate auxiliary regression models. In the first instance, we ran 
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Table-35 
RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE TWO 
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY 
HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL 
R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD 
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES. THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE 
PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE 
COMPRISES OF 80 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS, OF WHICH 17 ARE NOT LISTED BY 
IBES AND ARE ASSUMED TO HAVE NO ANALYST FOLLOWING. 
SCAR = (3 + 
i o 
3 LINST + 
l i 
3 LMKT. CAP + /3 LNINST 
2 13 i 
Coefficient 
Estimates 8.7710 -0.2827 
(3.9089) (-1.2069) 
-1.3342 0.4603 
(-2.9798a) (1.0897) 
+ 3 LCorr + 
4 i 
3 LANLST*+ 
5 i 
3 LUDiv + 
6 i 
e 
i 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
0.0317 -0.0547 0.1749 
(0.1608) (-0.3302) (0.7899) 
F-Statistic: 3.462 
Adjusted R2: 0. 158 
a.Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
* Since the variable ANLST has a large number of values equal to zero, we 
have added a value of 0.01 to it before computing its logarithmic value. 
a multivariate regression with the absolute magnitude of the two-day 
(t=-l,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST, LMKT. CAP, LNINST, 
LANLST, LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables. The results, given in 
Table 35 above, indicate that the t-value relative to the coefficient for 
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LMKT CAP is statistically significant at the 0.10 level, and somewhat 
stronger (at -2.9798) than the t-value reported in Table 30 (-2.5698), 
although the absolute magnitude of the coefficient is somewhat less. A 
comparison of the results presented in Table 35 with the results reported 
in Table 30 also reveals a corresponding decline in the estimated 
coefficient and t-values for the percentage of institutional equity 
holding proxy (-0.2826 and -1.2069 reported in Table 35 compared with 
-0.4748 and -1.5483, respectively, reported in Table 30). Moreover, 
similar to the findings given in Table 30, while the coefficients for 
LMKT. CAP, LINST, LANLST and LUDIV maintain their expected signs, the 
coefficients for LNINST and LC0RR show positive signs. The reason for 
the positive sign on LNINST is possibly because of a high level of 
col 1inearity, particularly with the LMKT. CAP, LINST and LANLST 
26 
variables. The regression, reported in Table 35, has a higher F- 
statistic of 3.462 which with (7,73) degrees of freedom is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level. 
Hence, from this multivariate auxiliary regression model, market 
capitalization appears even stronger as a proxy variable whereas the 
explanatory power of the percentage of institutional equity holding proxy 
is somewhat weakened. To further substantiate this conclusion, we 
conducted an exploratory univariate regression test with the absolute 
magnitude of the two-day (t=—1,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and 
LMKT. CAP as the independant variable. The results, given in Table 36 
(on page 125), appear to confirm the findings from the multivariate 
regression, since the t-value for the LMKT. CAP variable is now -4.2678. 
2 
The regression has an F-statistic of 18.291 and an Adjusted R of 0.1796. 
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Table 36 
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, 
AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT.CAP) AS INDEPENDANT 
VARIABLE. THE VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE 
REGRESSION. 
Independant 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic F-statistic Adjusted R' 
LMKT.CAP -1.3154 -4.2768a 18.291 0.1796 
(9.7096) (6.8240a) 
a. Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
Overall, these results are stronger than those obtained from the 
univariate regression with the actual "event period" SCAR as the 
dependant variable and LMKT. CAP els the independant variable, reported in 
Table 29 on page 115. 
6.3.3 Analysis with the Positive Event Period SCAR observations 
Our hypotheses, detailed in Chapter 3, rests on the theoretical 
underpinning that, in general, dividend initiation announcements are 
associated with statistically significant positive abnormal returns. 
Hence, it would be interesting to statistically probe into the role of 
the independant variables in explaining the magnitude of only the 
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Table-37 
RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE OF THE TWO 
DAY (T=-l,0) STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE 
DEPENDANT VARIABLE, AND THE NATURAL LOGS OF % OF INSTITUTIONAL EQUITY 
HOLDING (LINST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT. CAP), NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (LNINST), ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET MODEL 
R2(LC0RR), THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (LANLST) AND DIVIDEND YIELD 
(LUDIV) AS INDEPENDANT VARIABLES. THE NUMBERS OUTSIDE (WITHIN) THE 
PARENTHESES REPRESENT THE COEFFICIENT VALUES (T-VALUES). THE SAMPLE 
COMPRISES OF 55 DIVIDEND INITIATING FIRMS. 
SCAR = p + p LINST + (3 LMKT. CAP + 
10 1 12 i 
Coefficient 
Estimates 10.2440 -0.3709 -1.4492 
(3.7958) (-1.2088) (-2.4884a) 
p LNINST 
3 i 
0.5336 
(0.8848) 
* 
+ P LCorr + 
4 i 
p LANLST + 
5 i 
p LUDiv 
6 i 
Coefficient -0.1419 0.0015 0.3985 
Estimates (-0.4110) (0.0067) (1.4390) 
F-Statistic: 3.296 
2 
Adjusted R : 0.203 
a.Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
positive two day Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns. We, 
therefore, ran a multivariate regression with only the positive two-day 
(t=—1,0) SCAR as the dependant variable and LINST, LMKT. CAP, LNINST, 
LANLST, LCORR and LUDIV as independant variables. The total sample 
comprised of 55 firm-event observations. The results, given in Table 37 
above, largely corroborate our findings for the auxiliary regression with 
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Table 38 
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION WITH THE POSITIVE VALUE OF THE TWO DAY (T=-1,0) 
STANDARDIZED MEAN CUMULATIVE ABNORMAL RETURN AS THE DEPENDANT VARIABLE, 
AND THE NATURAL LOG OF MARKET CAPITALIZATION (LMKT.CAP) AS INDEPENDANT 
VARIABLE. THE VALUES IN PARENTHESES PERTAIN TO THE CONSTANT TERM OF THE 
REGRESSION. 
Independant 
Variables Coefficient t-statistic F-statistic Adjusted R‘ 
LMKT. CAP -1.5351 
(11.0930) 
-3.9626a 
(6.0596a) 
15.701 0.2140 
a. Significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. 
the absolute magnitudes of the Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
with respect to the market capitalization and percentage of institutional 
equity holding proxies. Moreover, while the coefficients for LMKT. CAP, 
LINST, LCORR and LUDIV maintain their expected signs, the coefficients 
for LNINST and LANLST show positive signs. The reason for the positive 
signs on LNINST and ANLST is possibly because of a high level of 
col 1inearity, particularly with the LMKT. CAP, and LINST variables. 
Hence, from this multivariate auxiliary regression model as well, market 
capitalization appears to gain in strength as a proxy variable whereas 
the explanatory power of the percentage of institutional equity holding 
proxy is somewhat weakened. 
We also conducted an exploratory univariate regression test with 
the positive values of the two-day (t=-1,0) SCAR as the dependant 
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variable and LMKT. CAP as the independant variable. The results, given 
in Table 38, on page 128, appear to confirm the findings from the 
multivariate regression. From the Table, the t-value for the LMKT. CAP 
variable is -3.9625. The regression has an F-statistic of 15.701 and an 
2 
Adjusted R of 0.2140. Overall, these results too are stronger than 
those obtained from the univariate regression with the actual "event 
period" SCAR as the dependant variable and LMKT. CAP as the independant 
variable, reported in Table 29. 
Overall, the auxiliary regression results discussed in Sections 
6.3.2 and 6.3.3 above appear to confirm our earlier conclusions that 
Market Capitalization, and, to a lesser extent. Percentage of 
Institutional Equity Holding, are perhaps the most powerful explanatory 
proxy variables for the information environment amongst those examined in 
this study. 
6.4 Post Dividend Initiation Dispersion of Analysts* Earnings Forecasts 
Table 39, presented on the following page, provides a comparative 
reading of the DISP variable in the pre-announcement month with the DISP 
variable in the post-announcement month, for the 26 observations with 
available data. From the Table, we note that for 14 firms, or 54% of the 
subsample, there is a decline in the dispersion of earnings forecasts. 
This suggests a greater degree of consensus amongst analysts’ after the 
initiation announcement, possibly resulting from its informational value. 
In 6 instances, however, (23% of the subsample) there is an increase in 
dispersion. 
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Table-39 
A COMPARISON OF THE DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS IN THE 
MONTH BEFORE THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT WITH THE DISPERSION OF 
ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS AFTER THE DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENT 
FOR 26 FIRMS 
No. of Firms % of Firms 
Increase in Dispersion 6 23 
Dispersion Unchanged 6 23 
Decrease in Dispersion 14 54 
Total 26 100 
6.5 A Comparative Evaluation of the Proxies 
A question might arise as to whether the proxies, particularly 
INST, MKT.CAP, NINST, and ANLST are highly correlated and, therefore, in 
effect proxying for one another. Tables 40 to 42 give the correlation 
matrices of the proxies for different firm-event observations. Table 40 
27 
gives the correlation matrix of five of the proxies , in the context of 
28 
all of the 80 firm-event observations. From the table, we see that the 
correlation coefficient between MKT.CAP and NINST is the highest 
(0.5378). Surprisingly, the correlation coefficient between INST and 
NINST is somewhat lower at 0.5055. The correlation coefficient of ANLST 
is highest with NINST (0.5111), followed by MKT. CAP (0.5009) and INST 
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Table-40 
A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL 
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET 
MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 80 
DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS. 
VARIABLES INST MKT.CAP NINST R2 ANLST 
INST 1.0000 
MKT.CAP 0.2357 1.0000 
NINST 0.5055 0.5378 1.0000 
R2 0.1391 0.1626 0.0823 1.0000 
ANLST* 0.4347 0.5009 0.5111 0.2926 1.0000 
* The sample includes 17 firms not listed by IBES and assumed to have no 
analyst following. 
(0.4347). The correlation coefficient between MKT.CAP and INST is 
0.2357. The R2proxy has low correlation coefficients with each of the 
four other proxies. This finding is consistent with our analysis in 
sections 6.1 and 6.3 which showed marked differences in the results 
obtained from the R2 proxy relative to the other proxies. Table 41 
excludes the 17 firms not listed by IBES and provides the correlation 
matrix for 63 firm-event observations for which information pertaining 
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Table-41 
A CORRELATION MATRIX OF FIVE PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL 
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP),NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET 
MODEL R2 (R2), AND THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) FOR 63 
DIVIDEND INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS. 
VARIABLES INST MKT.CAP NINST R2 ANLST 
INST 1.0000 
MKT.CAP 0.1871 1.0000 
NINST 0.4644 0.5283 1.0000 
R2 0.1009 0.2140 0.0840 1.0000 
ANLST* 0.5018 0.5214 0.5335 0.4146 1.0000 
* The sample excludes firms not listed by IBES, on the premise that there 
is insufficient information about the number of analysts following these 
firms. 
to the ANLST variable is definitely available. We note that the 
correlation coefficient between ANLST and NINST is now the highest 
(0.5335) followed by MKT.CAP and NINST (0.5283). The ordering of the 
correlation coefficients between ANLST and MKT. CAP (at 0.5214) and ANLST 
and INST (0.5018) remain the same as in Table 40, although the magnitudes 
of the coefficients are now higher. The correlation coefficient of INST 
with NINST (0.4644) and MKT.CAP (0.1871) remain relatively low. Once 
again, the R2 proxy has low correlation coefficients with each of the 
other four proxy variables. 
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Table-42 
A CORRELATION MATRIX OF SIX PROXY VARIABLES, NAMELY, % OF INSTITUTIONAL 
EQUITY HOLDING (INST), MARKET CAPITALIZATION (MKT.CAP), NUMBER OF 
INSTITUTIONS HOLDING FIRM EQUITY (NINST), THE ESTIMATION PERIOD MARKET 
MODEL R2 (R2), THE NUMBER OF ANALYSTS FOLLOWING (ANLST) AND THE 
DISPERSION OF ANALYSTS’ EARNINGS FORECASTS (DISP) FOR 26 DIVIDEND 
INITIATION ANNOUNCEMENTS. 
VARIABLES INST MKT.CAP NINST R2 ANLST DISP 
INST 1.0000 
MKT. CAP 0.0269 1.0000 
NINST 0.6220 0.6990 1.0000 
R2 -0.1036 0.1778 0.1545 1.0000 
ANLST 0.2948 0.4216 0.6362 0.4274 1.0000 
DISP -0.1111 -0.1036 0.0534 0.0875 -0.1402 1.0000 
* This correlation matrix pertains to 26 "firm-events" for which the 
number of analysts following exceeded 1 and the mean and standard 
deviation of analysts earnings forecasts were positive from the IBES 
tapes. 
Finally, Table 42, reported above, provides a correlation matrix 
of all six proxy variables (including DISP) for 26 firm-event 
observations. The purpose of this matrix is to observe the correlation 
of the DISP variable with the other variables. From the table, we note 
that DISP does not appear to be strongly correlated with any of the other 
variables. 
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In general, the results reported in Tables 40 to 42 do not 
suggest a sizeable overlap between any of the proxies discussed. Hence, 
each of the six proxies appear to have separate identities, and merit 
separate analyses. 
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Chapter 6 Endnotes 
1. See, for instance, Asquith and Mullins [1983]. 
2. The average dividend yield was computed in the following steps: 
i) The CRSP Daily Master distribution code as well as the Wall Street 
Journal Index were scanned to determine the nature of each dividend 
initiation - i.e whether it represented a quarterly, semi-annual or 
an annual payment. In cases where the payment was semi-annual or 
annual in nature, the absolute amount of the dividend initiation 
was corrected in order to make it comparable with a quarterly 
payment. This was done by dividing each semi-annual payment by two 
and each annual payment by four. 
ii) The dividend yield for each firm was computed by dividing this 
"revised" absolute dividend by the share price on the day of the 
initiation announcement. Finally, the average dividend yield was 
computed by dividing the total dividend yield within each portfolio 
by the number of firms in the portfolio. 
3. In this context, one point of interest is that, on average, the 
absolute magnitude of the dividend was higher at $ 0.113 for the 
"medium/high" institutional holding firms as opposed to $ 0.098 for 
the "low" institutional holding firms. 
4. For instance, Asquith and Mullins [1983]. 
5. The mean dividend yield for these five firms at 0.045196 was 2.39 
standard deviations from the average portfolio dividend yield. 
6. This phenomenon has been well documented in prior studies - see, for 
instance, Kross [1985]. 
7. Earlier, Table 5 had presented similar evidence of leakage of 
information of a much greater magnitude on day -3 for the 
"medium/high" institutional holding category. We attribute this 
occurrence to some observations which are common to the two portfolio 
groups. 
8. Similar to our discussion on the percentage of institutional equity 
holding, firms with lesser number of institutions participating in 
equity tended, on average, to have lower share prices. 
9. Although to a lesser extent than for the other proxies examined, 
the impact of the dividend initiation announcement appears to be 
captured mostly on day -1, owing to transmission of the news over the 
Broad Tape. 
10. This is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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11. As reported earlier the impact of the dividend initiation 
announcement appears to be captured mostly on day -1. 
12. This is significant at the 0.05 level. 
13. In the IBES data set, the number of analysts following a firm in any 
given month, is recorded as the "Number of Sellside Estimates". An 
official of Lynch, Jones and Ryan explained that this meant the 
number of marketable analyst estimates at any given point of time. 
14. While the impact of the dividend initiation announcement appears to 
be captured mostly on day -1, owing to transmission of the news over 
the Broad Tape, there also appears to be a sizeable leakage of 
information on day -3 when the AR is 1.02% with a t-value of 2.13. 
15. Hence, the portfolio characteristics for the "medium/high" group 
remain unchanged in the second stage analysis. 
16. Others, notably Patell and Wolfson [1979] and Christie [1983] have 
provided similar evidence for other regular announcements. 
17. In this analysis, 17 firms not listed by IBES, are assumed to have no 
analyst following. 
18. This sample includes 17 firms not listed in the IBES tapes. We 
assumed that these firms did not have any analyst following. 
19. Since the variable ANLST had a large number of values equal to zero, 
we added a value of 0.01 to it before computing its logarithmic value. 
This procedure has been recommended in Winer [1971, p.400], A 
similar transformation was used in Kross, Ro and Schroeder [1990]. 
Throughout the different stages of our analyses, we experimented by 
adding other constants, such as 1 and 0.1, with largely similar 
results. 
20. The coefficient for LINST is significant at the 0.20 level. 
21. A more complete discussion of the extent of correlation between the 
proxy measures follows in Section 6.5. 
22. This sample excludes the 17 firms, not listed in the IBES tapes, on 
the premise that there is insufficient information about the extent 
of analyst following on these firms. 
23. The coefficient for LINST is significant at the 0.20 level, although, 
again, its value is less than the value reported in Table 30. 
24. This sample was comprised of firm-events for which the Number of 
Analysts Following exceeded 1 and the mean and standard deviation of 
analysts earnings forecasts, in the month prior to dividend 
initiation, were positive. 
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25. LANLST here is the natural log of the untransformed variable ANLST, 
as none of the observations pertaining to the ANLST variable are zero 
in this sample. 
26. A more complete discussion of the extent of correlation between the 
proxy measures follows in Section 6.5. 
27. The variable DISP is not included here. 
28. This sample includes 17 firms, not included in the IBES tapes, for 
which the Number of Analysts Following is assumed to be zero. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
Consistent with evidence documented in earlier studies by Asquith 
and Mullins [1983], Healy and Palepu [1988] and Venkatesh [1989], our 
results show that dividend initiation announcements are associated with 
highly significant abnormal returns. Most of this abnormal return is 
concentrated on the day before the dividend initiation announcement is 
reported in the Wall Street Journal, suggesting that for a majority of 
our "firm-event" observations, the news gets transmitted over the Broad 
Tape on this day. 
Our analysis with the six information environment proxy measures 
indicates that the association between abnormal returns and dividend 
initiation announcements appears to be much stronger for the "low" 
information environment firms than for the "medium/high" information 
environment firms, more so in the context of the MKT. CAP and INST 
proxies, and to a lesser extent for the ANLST and NINST proxies. The 
event period returns volatility measures also show increments of over 1.5 
times relative to estimation period volatilities for the "low information 
environment" firms, in the context of the INST, MKT.CAP and NINST 
proxies. However, for the "medium/high" information environment firms, 
average event period returns variances are actually lower than average 
estimation period variances for the MKT. CAP and NINST proxies and 
approximately the same for the INST proxy. Such differences in results, 
between "low" and "medium/high" firms, are not observed for the ANLST 
proxy. Hence, with the exception of the ANLST proxy, the results of the 
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volatility analysis discussed in section 6.2 appear to be generally 
supportive of the evidence from the abnormal returns analysis discussed 
in sections 6.1 and 6.3. 
Three sets of univariate and multivariate regression models are 
tested in the study. While all the models have, in common, the natural 
logs of the information environment proxy variables and the dividend 
yield as independant variables, they have differed with respect to the 
dependant variable. The first regression model has the actual value of 
the event period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return as the dependant 
variable. The regression results indicate that MKT. CAP is the most 
powerful explanatory proxy of the information environment among those 
examined. INST, ANLST and NINST also appear to be good proxies. The 
second regression model involves analysis with the absolute value of the 
Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return whereas the third model contains 
only the positive event period Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Return 
observations. From the latter two models, MKT. CAP appears to be even 
stronger as an information environment proxy variable whereas the 
explanatory power of the INST proxy is somewhat weakened, relative to the 
results reported in the first regression model. MKT. CAP clearly appears 
to be the dominant independant variable from our findings. Since the 
total number of dividend initiation observations in our study is 80, to 
some extent our findings may be sample specific. 
A shortcoming of our analysis with the ANLST variable is that we 
did not have data on the Number of Analysts Following for 17, out of a 
total of 80, "firm-event" observations. Hence a two stage procedure was 
followed in our analysis with regard to this proxy. In the first stage, 
139 
all 80 "firm-events" were included in the analysis and we assumed that 
the 17 firms, for which data was not available, had no analyst following. 
In the second stage, we excluded the 17 firms on the premise that there 
was insufficient information about the extent of analyst following for 
these firms. From our discussions in the context of the Abnormal Returns 
study given in Section 6.1.2.5, the Volatility study reported in 
Section 6.2 and the Regression analysis given in Section 6.3, we find 
that the results for the second stage analysis have been consistently 
stronger. While this appears to indicate that the Number of Analysts 
Following is a powerful explanatory proxy for the firm’s information 
environment, this conclusion might have been further reinforced had data 
been available for all 80 "firm-events" in our sample. 
Our examination of the DISP proxy was also constrained by 
limitations of data availability. Since this proxy attempts to capture 
differences of beliefs amongst analysts, it can only be studied in the 
context of firms for which the Number of Analysts Following exceeds one. 
Moreover, since this proxy involves computing the coefficient of 
variation of analysts’ earnings forecasts, it entails that the mean and 
standard deviation of analysts earnings forecasts be non-zero and 
positive entities. Given these constraints, our analysis of the DISP 
proxy was conducted with a modest sample of 26 "firm-event" observations. 
Consequently, our examination was confined to regression analysis. 
While the results of these regressions appear to be encouraging, any 
interpration of the findings is considerably weakened by the modest 
sample of 26 observations. The results, however, certainly call for 
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subsequent investigation of this variable’s potential role as a proxy, 
with larger samples. 
2 
The results with respect to the R proxy are never strong, and 
contrast with Richardson’s [1984] encouraging findings in the context of 
earnings announcements. In general, four of the six proxies examined - 
namely market capitalization, the percentage of institutional equity 
holding, the number of institutions holding the firm’s equity, and the 
number of analysts following - appear to be powerful indicators of the 
firm’s information environment. The dispersion of analysts’ earnings 
forecasts is also potentially a good, qualitative proxy variable. 
Overall, the explanatory power of the market capitalization proxy appears 
to be the strongest. 
7.2 Contribution of Study 
A voluminious number of academic studies have sought to 
empirically examine the "dividend signalling" hypothesis. Much of the 
evidence provided in these studies appears to indicate that dividend 
initiations convey unanticipated information to the market, and that 
dividend policy is, therefore, at least perceived to be relevant to firm- 
valuation. 
The major objective of this study is to examine whether 
similar initial dividend payments have differing implications for 
firm-valuation, depending on the firm’s information-environment. In this 
respect, the study provides further direct evidence of the 
"dividend-signalling" hypothesis on the premise that the hypothesized 
announcement effects will occur only if investors impute a "signalling" 
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value to the dividend. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the 
first attempt to examine the informational effects of dividend 
initiation announcements in the context of the firm’s information 
environment. Recent studies by Mangiero [1988], Eddy and 
Seifert [1988] and Brown, Choi and Kim [1989] have sought to examine the 
informational effects of regular dividend announcements in the context of 
asymmetrical information environments. All three studies have used 
market capitalization (or size) to proxy for the information environment. 
By focussing our investigation on dividend initiations rather than 
regular dividend announcements we have made two important new 
contributions to the existing body of literature on dividend issues 
1) We have provided results which are not subject to the controversy 
generated by the findings of Bajaj and Vijh [1990]. Bajaj and Vijh 
examine the market’s response to all regular dividend announcements 
without any ex-post selection and document significantly higher 
positive excess returns for smaller firms. The authors view their 
findings as anomalous in the light of existing theories of asset 
pricing. Indeed, Bajaj and Vijh’s evidence does, to some extent, tone 
down the conclusion of greater informational effects of regular 
dividend announcements for smaller firms documented in Eddy and Seifert 
[1988]. The premise of this study, however, is that the anomalous 
findings of Bajaj and Vijh should not apply to dividend initiations, 
since these events, unlike subsequent regular dividend announcements, 
are not regular or predictable occurrances. 
2) A difficulty commonly encountered by empirical studies on regular 
dividend announcements has been to adequately isolate and control for 
142 
investor expectations. By examining dividend initiations, we have 
attempted to mitigate this problem. The dividend initiating firms in 
our sample do not have any prior record of cash dividend payments. 
Hence, for this sample, the naive model should reflect investors’ 
expectations much better than for subsequent regular dividend changes. 
Moreover, since dividend initiations are rare events, any hypothesized 
dividend effects should be most visible at initiation, on the premise 
that these announcements are more likely to be unexpected than 
subsequent regular cash dividend announcements (Asquith and Mullins 
[1983]). 
The findings of the study appear to reinforce the "dividend 
signalling" argument. In this context, it would be pertinent to analyze 
the implications of alternate theories, particularly the tax-clientele 
argument. If tax clienteles are relevant, then the initiation of 
dividend payments should induce a change in clienteles - specifically, 
from high tax bracket investors to low tax bracket investors. Clientele 
shifts of this nature, however, do not explain why the market’s reaction 
to dividend initiation announcements by "low information environment" 
firms should be systematically higher than its reaction to similar 
announcements by "medium and high information environment" firms. 
Our study has, for the first time, addressed the issue of whether 
the volatility of security price reaction to a dividend initiation 
announcement is systematically associated with the firm’s information 
environment. In general, we feel that our findings make an important 
contribution to the existing body of empirical literature on the 
volatility of security returns. For instance, studies by Patel 1 and 
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Wolfson [1979], Christie [1983] and Kalay and Lowenstein [1985] report 
that stock returns are more volatile around regularly scheduled 
announcements, due to high levels of uncertainty surrounding these 
events. Specifically, the Kalay and Lowenstein [1985] study examines 
regular cash dividend announcements. Our findings indicate that while, 
in general, the volatility of security returns does increase sizeably at 
the time of dividend initiation announcements by "low information 
environment" firms, such increases in "event period" returns volatility 
are not found for the "medium/high information environment" firms with 
respect to three proxies for the information environment examined. In 
fact, for the "medium/high information environment" firms, average event 
period returns variances are actually lower than average estimation 
period variances for the market capitalization and number of institutions 
holding firm-equity proxies and approximately the same for the percentage 
of institutional equity holding proxy. Based on our findings for 
dividend initiations, we feel, that the firm’s information environment 
may have a significant impact on the behaviour pattern of the volatility 
of security returns around other corporate announcements. 
Finally, the testing of "unanticipated" dividend initiation 
announcement effects in the light of the six information environment 
proxies has served a dual purpose 
i) It has enabled us to identify a relation between the market reaction 
to the dividend initiation and the firm-specific proxy variables whose 
values are known prior to the announcement. Examining price reaction 
and volatility together has strengthened our analysis since the 
hypotheses predict corroborative evidence. 
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ii) This has also enabled us to understand and identify the variables 
which define the firm’s information environment more effectively thus 
providing useful, normative decision rules. 
7.3 Avenues for Further Research 
A number of additional hypotheses, pertaining to the information 
content of dividend initiations as well as the firm’s information 
environment can be formulated and tested. First, an examination of the 
temporal breakup of the sample of dividend initiations detailed in Table 
1, shows a sizeable clustering of firm-events in the years 1976, 1977 and 
1987. It may be noted that legislation pertaining to tax law changes in 
1986 immediately preceded the dividend initiations in 1987. The 
clustering of dividend initiations in the years 1976 and 1977 could also 
have been motivated, at least in part, by some macro economic event. It 
would, therefore, be interesting to investigate whether there are 
systematic differences in the market’s reaction to dividend initiations 
which are motivated by macro economic issues and initiations which are 
not so motivated. We conducted a preliminary examination, wherein the 
dividend initiation announcements of 1976, 1977 and 1987 were grouped in 
one portfolio (comprising of 42 firm-events) and the announcements for 
the years 1978 to 1986 were grouped in another portfolio (comprising of 
38 firm-events). Our findings do not indicate evidence of significant 
differences in the market’s reaction to the firm-events in the two 
portfolios. However, our preliminary investigation did not control for 
factors such as the magnitude of dividend yield. We feel, therefore, 
145 
that more rigorous analysis may provide further interesting insights into 
the motivation for initiating regular dividend payments. 
Studies which have found evidence of information content in 
dividend initiation announcements have often disagreed about the nature 
of such information. For instance, Asquith and Mullins [1983] and Healy 
and Palepu [1988] suggest that dividend initiations may convey valuable 
information regarding current and future earnings. However, McCann 
[1987] has suggested that the initiation of dividend payments, by 
allowing the firm broader access to capital markets and lowering its cost 
of capital, is signalling not higher earnings but lower risk. Indeed 
McCann finds evidence of a significant decrease in the growth in the cash 
flow per share following the initiation of dividends although investment 
activity is found to increase significantly as well. McCann’s findings, 
when combined with the results of this study, suggest several interesting 
questions for future investigation. For instance, do firms that initiate 
dividend payments share certain common traits at the time of and 
subsequent to the initiation? An exploratory study into the nature of 
the characteristics shared by firms at the time of initiation may 
generate insights which could help to predict some generalizable 
1 
circumstances that may occur at the time of dividend initiations. 
The association between the information content of dividend 
initiation announcements and the information environment can be 
investigated further in several ways. While the focus of this study has 
been the analysis of abnormal returns and volatility of returns around 
dividend initiation announcements, further examination could be extended 
2 
to studies on trading volume and the market micro structure. Yet 
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another extension could be a separate investigation of dividend 
initiating OTC firms. 
Finally, a study could focus on the firm’s information 
environment using the initiation of dividend payments as one of several 
"informational events". Such a study could not only explore several 
alternative proxies for the information environment, but also examine the 
consistency in the association between the information environment and 
each "informational event". 
147 
Chapter 7 Endnotes 
1. As an example, we found that, very often, firms initiated dividend 
payment soon after acquiring exchange-1isted status. 
2. Theoretically, price and volume have been shown to capture different 
aspects of investors’ reactions (Beaver [1968]). The price change is 
observed when the average investor revises his beliefs in one 
direction. However, the volume reaction is observed when investors 
revise their beliefs in a heterogenous manner. Empirical evidence 
(see Bamber [1986], [1987]), indicates that price changes and volume 
reactions are often highly correlated. The reason may be that when 
information is released, investors usually interpret it in one 
direction, but revise their expectations by different magnitudes. 
While this revision of beliefs in the same direction causes a price 
change, the revision by different magnitudes induces a trading volume 
reaction. 
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APPENDIX 
SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
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APPENDIX A 1* 
SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND POLICY THEORY 
Study/Subject. 
Miller and Modigliani [1961] 
/Dividend Irrelevance 
Farrar and Selwyn [1967] 
/Dividends & personal taxes 
Brennan [1970] 
/General Equilibrium 
with dividends & taxes 
Conclusion 
Under a strict set of assumptions 
dividends are irrelevant to the 
value of the firm; but there may 
be an information content to the 
dividend. 
Investors have a choice between 
dividends and capital gains, and 
will prefer capital gains as long 
as the tax rate on capital gains 
is less than on personal income. 
With constant risk, investors 
demand higher total returns on 
higher yield shares, due to 
higher dividend tax. 
Miller & Scholes [1978] 
/Tax Hedge 
Feenberg [1981] 
/Test of Tax Hedge 
Peterson, Peterson and Ang [1985] 
/Test of Dividend Taxes 
Investors need not pay a higher 
tax rate on dividend income, and 
so dividend irrelevance might hold 
even with personal taxes. 
Only about 2.5% of individuals can 
make use of tax-sheltering 
provision. 
Investors pay substantial taxes on 
dividends. 
* The studies have been sequenced in accordance with the subject theme 
developed in Chapter 2 and not on a temporal basis. 
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John & Kalay [1982] 
/Dividends & bondholder, 
stockholder agency conflicts. 
Rozeff [1981] 
/Dividend payments & manager- 
stockholder agency issues. 
Easterbrook [1984] 
/Dividend payments & manager- 
stockholder agency issues. 
Smaller dividend payouts are 
better for bondholders interests, 
to avoid wealth redistribution 
from bondholders to stockholders. 
"Financing" of dividend payments 
may reduce agency costs. Hence 
there could be a trade-off 
between flotation costs of 
raising external capital and the 
reduced agency costs. 
"Financing" of dividends sends 
positive signals, as it leads to 
higher monitoring of the firm. 
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APPENDIX A 2 
SUMMARY OF DIVIDEND SIGNALLING THEORIES 
Study/Subject Conclusion 
Ross [1977]. 
/Incentive signalling 
model. 
The paper models types A & B firms, 
where B firms have lower value after 
period. Type B firms cannot afford to 
signal falsely, as management 
compensation is positively linked to 
firm value. 
Bhattacharya [1979] 
/Dividend signals & taxes. 
Investors are willing to pay higher 
taxes to receive dividend "signals", 
which convey unique information about 
firm-value. 
Hakansson [1982] 
/General equilibrium 
dividend signalling model. 
For dividends to be useful "signals", 
they should not only be informative 
but investors should have heterogenous 
beliefs and consumption attitudes, and 
financial markets should be incomplete. 
Miller and Rock [1985] 
/Dividend signals & 
financing 
The "financing" of dividends sends 
negative signals as it connotes 
under-investing. 
John and Williams [1982] 
/Equilibrium dividend¬ 
signalling model. 
Firms with more favourable inside 
information optimally pay larger 
dividends and realize higher prices 
for their stock whenever the demand 
for cash by the firm and its current 
stockholders exceeds the internal 
supply of cash. 
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Ambarish, John and Williams [1987] Adverse tax effects may render the 
/Equilibrium with multiple dividend an uneconomical signal, 
signals. By combining the dividend signal with 
other signals, the firm may be able 
to obtain a less-costly signalling mix. 
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APPENDIX A 3 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DIVIDEND SIGNALLING 
Study 
Fama et al. [1969]. 
Pettit [1972]. 
Charest [1978]. 
Watts [1973]. 
Gonedes [1978]. 
* The studies have been 
developed in Chapter 
Conclusion. 
Stock splits do convey information 
about dividend increases which in turn 
signal higher future cash flows. 
There is "information content" in 
dividend announcements and the market 
adjusts immediately to the 
announcement. 
There is "information content" in 
dividend announcements, but the NYSE 
is slow to discount dividend 
reductions suggesting market 
inefficiency. 
There is no information content in 
dividend announcements. A problem with 
his model is that it uses monthly 
data, which does not allow him to 
explicitly control for other events. 
Current & past dividends do not improve 
accuracy of forecasts of future 
earnings relative to forecasts based 
on only current & past earnings. 
Hence, there is no information content 
in dividends. This study also uses 
monthly data. 
sequenced in accordance with the subject theme 
: and not on a temporal basis. 
Aharony and Swary [1980] The study uses daily data and controls 
for earnings announcement effects. It 
finds that dividends convey 
information beyond historical 
earnings. 
Kalay [1980] Most dividend cuts are not forced 
through contractual arrangements. 
Possibly such cuts signal management’s 
need to conserve liquid funds. 
Woolridge and Ghosh [1987] While the market reacts negatively to 
all cuts, it later reacts positively 
to firms which cut dividends to 
increase investment. 
Woolridge [1983]/ 
Handjinicloaou and Kalay [1984] 
Little evidence of "wealth transfer" in 
dividend increases. Signalling effect 
appears to dominate. 
Divecha and Morse [1983] Find that firms decreasing their 
payout ratios at the time dividends 
were increased had higher abnormal 
returns than firms increasing their 
payout ratios. 
Asquith and Mullins [1983] Dividend initiations convey positive 
signals regarding future cash flows. 
Also the information content of 
initiations is higher than for 
subsequent regular dividends owing to 
higher element of "surprise". 
Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson 
[1986]. 
The study uses volume data. It finds 
no support for the clientele effect. 
Volome increases due to "signalling" 
effects. 
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Kane, Lee and Marcus [1984] Investors give more credence to 
unexpected dividend increases or 
decreases when earnings are also 
above or below expectations. 
Offer and Siegel [1987] The study refutes Gonedes [1978], by 
showing that security analysts revise 
forecasts following unexpected 
dividend changes and the magnitude of 
the revision is related to the 
dividend change. 
Healy and Palepu [1988] Dividend initiating firms experience 
earnings growth in the year of 
announcement and two subsequent years 
but not thereafter. 
Venkatesh [1989] Information content of earnings 
announcement is substantially lower 
after the introduction of quarterly 
cash dividends. This holds when 
earnings announcements precede or 
follow dividend announcements. 
McCann [1987] Dividend Initiation is associated with 
increased investment, due to a fall in 
cost of capital rather than increased 
profitability. This suggests that 
dividends signal not higher earnings 
but less risk. 
Eddy and Seifert [1988]/ 
Mangiero [1988] 
Information content of dividends is 
negatively related to firm-size. 
Brown, Choi and Kim [1989] (I) Information content of dividends 
and earnings is negatively related 
to firm-size. (II) Dividends are more 
preemptive of earnings, and hence are 
the more informative signal. 
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Bajaj and Vijh [1990] Document significant positive excess 
returns around dividend announcement 
dates. The positive excess returns are 
higher for small-firm, low-priced and 
high-yield stocks. These effects are 
as viewed as anomalous in the light of 
existing theories of asset pricing. 
\ 
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APPENDIX A 4* 
THE "DIFFERENTIAL INFORMATION" LITERATURE 
Study Conclusion. 
Barry and Brown [1985] Investors demand higher returns from 
low information securities due to 
higher uncertainty. Hence, their 
"excess" returns arise due to higher 
risk. 
Damodaran [1985] The return generating process of 
information deficient firms may 
resemble a mixed jump-diffusion 
process. Hence, stock prices 
of such firms adjust less frequently 
to reflect new information. 
Verrechia [1979] The amount of privately acquired 
information impounded in the stock 
price through trading increases as 
market participation increases. 
Atiase [1980] The amount of predisclosure information 
production and dissemination is an 
increasing function of capitalized 
firm-value. 
Richardson [1984] Institutions do not hold small firm 
stocks due to liquidity problems. 
Hence, analysts tend not to follow 
small firms.Also different measures 
of firm’s information environment are 
likely to be highly correlated with 
firm-size. 
* The studies have been sequenced in accordance with the subject theme 
developed in Chapter 2 and not on a temporal basis. 
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Atiase [1985] The study finds a much greater price 
adjustment for quarterly earnings 
announcements of small firms than of 
large firms. 
Freeman [1987] The findings are similar to Atiase [1985]. 
security prices of large firms 
anticipate accounting earnings earlier 
than security prices of small firms. 
Grant [1980] There is a higher flow of prior 
information for large firms between 
releases of accounting reports. Many 
more news items appear in WSJ for NYSE 
firms than OTC firms. 
Kross and Scroeder [1988] Earnings announcements convey more 
information on obscure firms than on 
prominent firms. 
McNichols and Manegold [1982] Report-week price reaction is higher,on 
average, for firms with no quarterly 
reports than for firms with quarterly 
reports. 
Arbel and Strebel [1982][1983] Neglected firms earn higher 
risk-adjusted returns, even after 
controlling for firm-size. 
Callahan, Elgers and Strock The study uses share price and analyst 
[1987] following as alternative proxies for 
differential information. After 
controlling for size-effect, only 
analyst following is consistent with 
the differential information 
hypothesis. 
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Bhushan [1989] The paper examines the major 
determinants of the number of 
analysts following a firm. It finds 
that the variable is positively 
related to the firm’s ownership 
structure,size and return variability 
and inversely related to the number of 
lines of business of the firm. 
Ajinkya, Atiase and Gift The degree of heterogeneity in beliefs, 
[1991] measured by the dispersion of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, is a determinant 
of the intensity of trading. 
Morse, Stephan and St ice Analysts’ forecasts become more 
[1991] dispersed, after earnings 
announcements, than would be expected 
in the absence of earnings 
announcements, an earnings 
announcement, due to nonsynchronous 
updating of forecasts by analysts. 
Partitioning the sample on the length 
of time between the announcement date 
and the next IBES report provides a 
more accurate measure of changes in 
the dispersion of forecasts due to an 
earnings announcement. 
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